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This thesis studied Automated Data Processing/Federal Information Processing
(ADP/FIP) protest issues brought before the General Sen ices Administration Board of
Contract Appeals (GSBCA) over a two-year period. The ADP/FIP acquisition
environment and process is presented. Also, the forums for ADP/FIP protests are explored
with an understanding of each forum's decision-making criteria developed. The objective
of this study was to identify the issues for protest most often faced by Contracting Officers,
as well as the issues that are "favored most" by the GSBCA. A mathematical model for
weighting all protest issues versus Board granted protest issues was developed and used
for the ranking and analysis process of this study. Case decisions are sighted as examples
in support of the quantitative analysis.
The thesis concludes that the solicitation and specification process is the source of
mest sustained protests. Further, the contracting officer's selection and evaluation process
is basically sound. Finally, this thesis demonstrates the GSBCA 's adherence and demand
for upholding the concept of competition. The Board's penchant for competition is
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. ADP/FIP ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENT - BACKGROUND
Congress has enacted many laws regarding the actions of the agencies of the United
States Government. Since the acclaimed first operational computer in 1945, a fury of
laws regulating Government acquisition of computers and their use has been put forth by
our Congressional leaders. The laws and subsequent regulations have developed a unique
community of specialists that primarily deal with computer and computer related
acquisitions.
A plethora of laws, regulations and guidance are provided by a large number of
Government agencies to regulate other Go\ eminent agencies. Not surprisingly, would be
providers and contractors of computers and automated data processing equipment
(ADPE) 1 have demanded the right to sell to the Government. When contractors are not
awarded or perceive that they may not be awarded an acquisition contract, they are
afforded the opportunity to protest. The protest is normally based on the belief that
proper procedures were not complied with (i.e., a law, regulation or published guidance
was not properly followed). The complexity of the laws and regulations surrounding
Automated Data Processing/Federal Information Processing (ADP/FIP) makes it more
likely that mistakes will be made [Ref l:p. Al].
"There is a general perception in the ADP[E] industry that some type of protest will
be filed on virtually every major ADP[E] buy" [Ref 2:p. 19]. Briefings by various
military acquisition officials lead the researcher to an unsupported conclusion that
contractors arc making a business decision to protest a large number of Government
1 The acronym - ADPE - has been replaced with another acronym - FIP (Federal Information
Processing Resources) - in the new FIRMR, published and codified in die Federal Register, Vol. 55, No.
250, pp. 53386-53428. on 28 Dec 1990 as 41 CH*, Chapter 201.
ADPE acquisition contract awards. For purely business reasons, (i.e., hurt the
competition, you can't lose - even if all you succeed in doing is delaying the original
award) contractors feel it is worth the time and effort to protest a Government ADPE
acquisition decision. Eben Townes, Director of Acquisition Management Services for
International Data Corp. in Vienna VA, noted that, "Protests are becoming part of
vendors' bidding strategy, rather than just a way to remedy wrongdoing." Critics of the
protest system charge that,
. . .protests routinely are filed by sore losers, by companies seeking to recoup their
cost or bv firms that see the legal route as a way to compensate for lack of experience.
[Ref l:p.*Al]
The protest decision may or may not be based on merit. The Government must then
defend its decision in a forum of the contractor's choosing. The protest, whether the
Government wins or loses, requires time and slows the procurement process. Mr. Renato
A. DiPentima, Deputy Associate Commissioner for Systems Integration for the Social
Security Administration in 1988, said: "I think we've finally gotten to the point where the
procurement cycle is longer than the technology cycle" [Ref l:p. All].
The protest process is one of the biggest obstacles to Government efficiency. Just
the threat of a protest can delay an award and/or force the Government to settle for older
technology [Ref 3].
B. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH
Federal ADP/FIP acquisition officials must be aware of the statutes and regulations
governing their profession. They must also be aware of the forums for protest as well as
the rules and procedures of those forums. Each forum can be said to have its own unique
"personality," or the persuasion around which it coddles. This thesis will present the
environment in which Government ADPE procuring officials work and the forums of
protest open to the disappointed offeror. The role of General Services Administration
Board of Contract Appeals (GSBCA) in ADP/FIP bid protests, the reasons for A DP/HP




What has been the role of the GSBCA concerning Automatic Data Processing
(ADP) protests and what can be learned from an analysis of recent GSBCA cases?
2. Subsidiary
1. What are the current GSBCA protest procedures?
2. How docs the GSBCA define ADP/FIP?
3. What are the principal reasons for ADP/FIP protests?
4. What have been the results of these protests?
5. Since GSBCA received jurisdiction over ADP/FIP acquisitions, what trends can be
identified regarding ADP protests?
6. What actions can be taken to minimize the number of ADP protests and the number
of sustained GSBCA decisions?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
This research effort will focus on the inner workings of the GSBCA. The study will
be limited to pre-award or award protests and will specifically exclude contract appeals,
disputes and claims. The stud) will involve an analysis of GSBCA protests filed during a
two year period and their disposition.
The researcher will assume that the reader has a basic know ledge of procurement,
acquisition, and contracting terminology and procedures. Terminology such as
specification types (i.e., performance, functional, design, etc.) are presumed to be
understood by the reader. However, some definitions specifically regarding computer
procurements are deemed appropriate for the reader's knowledge. Those definitions
follow in Section F of this chapter.
E. METHODOLOGY
The methodology and study consisted of a comprehensive literature and case review,
data compilation and evaluation, and selective telephone and personal interviews. The
literature review consisted of the GSBCA's ADP Protest Reports, Contract Law Journals,
General Accounting Office (GAO) Reports, Federal Contract Reports and information
from National Defense University's Information Resources Management curriculum,
various reports on the bid protest system, and selected periodicals. Data and statistical
analysis support were available from the General Services Administration's, (GSA) office
of Information Resources Management Service (IRMS). IRMS publishes the quarterly
ADP Protest Report.
The researcher established contact with selected contracting agencies to determine
their problems and to identify issues associated with ADP/FIP protests. Navy and Marine
Corps contracting agencies were contacted to determine their current experience in
ADP/FIP contracting related to bid protests. Interviews were conducted to validate the
information/data being compiled from the case analyses.
The focus of the research was on the GSBCA as a particular forum for protest of
ADP/FIP. An objective and subjective analysis was conducted on 175 cases. The
objective analysis involved a mathematical scoring process of ADP/FIP protest issues.
The subjective analysis provided the supporting information regarding the objective
analysis results.
F. DEFINITIONS
ADPE - A statutory term used in Public Law 89-306, the Brooks Act, as amended by
Public Law 99-500, the Paperwork Reduction Reauthorization Act (PRRA). ADPE is
generally accepted as meaning the hardware, software, and other ancillary equipment
associated with the manipulation of information. However, the statutory definition of this
term is much broader. This term will be more fully explained in the next chapter.
ADP - Refers to the manipulation of information. This term is different from ADPE
in common usage only. Normally, ADPE and ADP are used synonymously.
Federal Information Processing (F1P) - The term used in the Federal Information
Resources Management Regulation (FIRMR). As used in this thesis, it includes FIP
resources, equipment, maintenance, services, software, support services, and related
supplies. FIP resources is identical to the statutory definition of ADPE. However, the
GSA adopted the term FIP resources "as more descriptive than the statutory term ADPE"
[Ref 2:pS & Ref. 4j. The acronym ADP/FIP will be used when referring to the general
domain, large body of data processing.
Bid protest - A written grievance or objection by one who would be economically
affected by a Government agency's solicitation and award of a contract. The grievance
can be made prior to award of a contract (pre-award) or after the award of the contract
(post-award).
Protestor - The person or "interested party" filing the grievance.
Interested party - The protestor is an interested party, or any other person or party
that may be economically affected by the bid protest. This would include the awardee or
potential awardee and any potential contractor whose "bids were not submitted because of
an alleged defective specification." [Ref 5, p.265]
Temporary restraining order - Order by a Federal Court to stop the awarding of a
contract or performance of a contract for a temporary period, usually until a resolution of
the bid protest.
Injunction - Order by a Federal Court, the same as a temporary restraining order, but
with more permanence.
Oiher terms will be defined as necessary in the text of this thesis.
G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
1. Chapter II
This researcher intends to provide the reader with a short history and the
requirements of the most pertinent legislation and regulations regarding Governmental
ADPE acquisition. An open market environment exists for potential Defense contractors
who decide they were wronged in some manner. Note that the word is not contractors but
"potential contractors." A potential contractor who believes the Government was not fair
or improperly selected a competitor can protest the Government's action. A signed
contract need not exist in order for a potential Government contractor to proceed with a
bid protest. To protest a bid, a contractor is only required to serve notice to the procuring
Government agency or seek a remedy through the Federal Court system. This process is
unique to Government contracting. Bid protests do not exist in commercial contracting.
Government bid protest procedures exist because of written public policies and
regulations such as: the Competition in Contracting Act, The Brooks Act, the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the FIRMR and other public policy as discussed in
Chapter II. These documents and supporting circulars and bulletins describe the manner
in which the Government procurement process should take place.
2. Chapter III
The ADP/FIP Environment of Chapter II will be followed by a discussion in
Chapter III of the various protest forums with an emphasis on the GSBCA. A protestor
has many options in which to "avenge" their wrong. A Contracting Officer can therefore
expect a variety of different protest forums with a substantial number of different rules to
abide by. The purpose of this research paper is to identify the forums a protestor may
seek a remedy. Further, a secondary purpose is to impart some basic know ledge that a
Contracting Officer should be aware of regarding the procedures of each forum.
Although, generally the same protest rules apply regarding acquisition of automatic data
processing equipment and other acquisitions, the researcher will consider those forums
open to ADP/FIP purchases only. This chapter does not purport to treat each forum
thoroughly. Many issues will not be addressed. Specifically eliminated from discussion
are the timing and chronological requirements for protest actions.
3. Chapter IV
Chapter IV will present the methodology of the research in detail. A synopsis of
the methodology was presented above.
4. Chapter V
Chapter V will present the data derived from the objective case analyses. An
analysis by numerical percentages was conducted and found to have some weaknesses for
a complete understanding of the implications of the data. A weighted index comparing
the total sample population of cases with the same sample population of cases granted
was devised. Results of both the percentage and weighted index analysis are presented in
this chapter.
5. Chapter VI
Subjective case analyses were conducted and are presented in this chapter. The
subjective analyses are shown to support the objective data from Chapter V.
6. Chapter VII
Chapter VII is the conclusion chapter where the research questions will be
answered. Also, other conclusions and recommendations as a result of this research, will
be presented.
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A final series of quotes before proceeding into this thesis.
There is "no down side to protesting, no court costs" for the protestor, "...awards,
debriefs and protests are automatic" in ADP/FIP procurements. There is "no penalty
for frivolous lawsuits" from protestors. [Ref 6].
II. ADP/FIP ACQUISITION
ADP/FIP is a field in which a procurement professional could specialize for years
and still feel deficient in know ledge about their area of expertise. There is a myriad of
regulations, statutes, directives, and Court/Board decisions that provide procurement
guidance and precedence. The "guidance" provides special restrictions that the
Government levies on the use and acquisition of ADP/FIP. In addition, the procuring
official must understand the unique characteristics of computer operations. In conducting
this research, the researcher has found that there is a profusion of information that is often
confusing regarding ADP/FIP acquisitions. The stout of heart could become
overwhelmed with the seemingly endless amount of information and "must do's" in order
to make fairly simple ADP purchases for the Government. This chapter is therefore
limited to understanding the congressional laws and mandates and the applications of
those by the various governing agencies. Specifically, the purpose is to examine the
impact of the Brooks Act on ADP/FIP acquisition. The focus will be on ADP/FIP
acquisitions in the general sense and the GSA's implementation regulations.
For the purpose of this thesis, ADPE and ADP/FIP will be used interchangeably.
There is, however, a difference that should be noted. Normally, ADPE refers to the
equipment, hardware, firmware, and any ancillary equipment. ADP refers to the process
of manipulating information. It is the heart of all computer operations. FIP is the new
"umbrella" term used by the GSA in the FIRMR that includes ADP, ADPE &
telecommunications resources subject to their exclusive procurement authority. The term
ADPE and ADP/FIP will be used somewhat loosely. In most cases, the acronyms include
maintenance and ADP services.
A. LEGISLATION
1. Brooks Act
For Department of Defense (DoD) purposes, the Brooks Amendment (PL 89-
306) is the first piece of major legislation regarding the acquisition of ADPE. This Act of
Congress, passed in 1965, amended the Federal Property and Administrative Services
(FPAS) Act of 1949. The new section of the FPAS, embodied in the Brooks Act, in
effect created a new world of bureaucracy. The Act was:
To provide for the economic and efficient purchase, lease, maintenance,
operation, and utilization of automatic data processing equipment by Federal
departments and agencies. [Ref. 7]
To this end, the Brooks Act gave three Federal Agencies significant control over
the Government-wide use of computers [Ref. 8:p. 6]. They were the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), the GSA, and the National Bureau of Standards
(NBS). 1
GSA became the focal point for the acquisition of ADPE. Government agencies
were now required to coordinate the procurement of their ADPE through GSA. GSA
assumed the responsibility for the "purchase, lease, and maintenance of automatic data
processing equipment by Federal Agencies" [Public Law 89-306, 1965]. However, GSA
had the power to delegate that very same responsibility, which it did in many specific
cases. The Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)
contains a lengthy section, Part 270, describing those responsibilities. The unique aspect
of this responsibility given to GSA is its limitations. The Brooks Act prohibited GSA
*On Aug. 23, 1988 President Reagan signed the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act into law
officialh changing the name of the NBS to "National InsUtute of Standards and Technology" (NIST).
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from impairing or interfering "with the determination by agencies of their individual
ADPE requirements" [Ref. 7]. GSA could not control the use of ADPE by Federal
Agencies.
Although GSA could not control requirement determinations, it was given policy
control in conjunction with OMB. The Brooks Act placed responsibility upon the OMB
for ADP fiscal policy and control 1 [Ref 9:p. 1-2]. GSA's Deputy Assistant Administrator
for Federal Information Resources Management (FIRM) in GSA's IRMS was charged
with developing the Government-wide ADP policy [Ref. 9:p. 1-2].
The Secretary of Commerce gained the responsibility for providing scientific and
technological advisory services to agencies regarding ADP. It also was tasked with
recommending and establishing ADP standards for the Government. The National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), part of the Department of Commerce,
provides this function.
The Brooks Act obviously would cause problems for the DoD because of its
unique applications of computers and ADP in weapon systems and other specialized
applications. So, in 1981, the DoD Authorization Act of 1982, Public Law 97-86,
commonly referred to as the Warner Amendment to FPAS, was passed.
2. Warner Amendment
The Warner Amendment excludes the DoD from GSA oversight in procurements
which involve intelligence, national security cryptology, command &. control, and
weapon systems [Ref. 10]. However, when acquiring ADP equipment for general data
processing, which is used for routine administrative and business applications, DoD is
'Executive Orders in 1973 and 1975 modified Brooks. Today OMB is responsible for fiscal control,
policy formulation, and general oversight, GSA is responsible for development and oversight of ADP
policy.
1 1
subject to the same policies and standards that affect other branches of the Federal
Government under the provisions of the Brooks Act [Ref. 9:p. 1-3J. The Brooks Act with
the Warner Amendment exemptions is included in Appendix A. If a procurement is
excluded from GSA oversight, DoD still has the option to consult with GSA; however
notification is not required. DoD has taken advantage of this legislation on occasion and
interpreted the intent of the Warner Amendment loosely. According to GSA personnel,
this has prevented them from providing proper procurement guidance when it should
have been required [Ref. 11].
While the Brooks and Warner Amendments have had the greatest impact on
DoD, specifically regarding ADP/FIP acquisition, there are several other congressional
legislative actions that significantly affect procurement of supplies and services. Only a
few will be mentioned here.
3. Competition in Contracting Act (CICA)
The CICA of 1984 [Ref. 12] mandated that procurement actions be held on a
"full and open competition" basis. It also established seven exceptions to the requirement
for competitive procedures. Most notably for ADP/FIP acquisition, it gave contractors an
option of where to take their protests when dissatisfied with the Government's solicitation
and selection process. Contractors could choose between the GAO, or the GSBCA
[Ref. 12]. Other protest forums are available and will be discussed in Chapter III. The
GSBCA is authorized, under CICA, to hear and decide protests involving procurements
under the provisions of the Brooks Act [Ref. 4:p. 1-7]. Congress established the GSBCA
procedure to provide a more formal process of resolving disputes resulting from the
increasing number of ADP/FIP procurements and the complexity of the technology
[Ref. 13].
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4. The Paperwork Reduction Act
Public Law 93-51 1. passed in 1980, established the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs in the OMB. This office, as part of the OMB, is charged with
developing and implementing policy objectives of the Paperwork Reduction Act
[Rcf. 14]. The responsibility of the OMB is coordinating, promoting, evaluating and the
overseeing of Federal Agencies' use of information systems. As a result, this affects
DoD's use, and to a degree, acquisition of ADP/FIP systems. Further, the OMB must
monitor compliance with the Privacy Act of 1974. This in effect gave the OMB
regulator} authority over DoD and other Federal Agencies in the use of ADPE as
information systems. It may be argued that this conflicts with the Brooks Act. However,
upon closer examination it does not. There is a subtle difference in wording. The Brooks
Act implies that agencies may determine their own requirements for ADPE. The
Paperwork Reduction Act restricts/governs the use of that ADP equipment.
5. Paperwork Reduction Reauthorization Act
This Public Law 99-500 of 1986 redefined ADPE. The definition that follows is
now preferred [Ref. 15:A-165] for acquisition purposes:
ADPE is any equipment or interconnected system or subsystems of equipment
that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management,
movement, control, display, switching interchange, transmission, or reception, of data
or information - by a Federal agency, or under a contract with a Federal agency w hich
- recuires the use of such equipment, or requires the performance of a sen ice or the
furnishings of a product which is performed or produced making significant use of
such equipment. This includes: computers, ancillary equipment, software, firmware,
and similar procedures, sen ices, including support services, and related resources as
defined bv regulations issued bv the Administrator for General Services.
[Ref. 16: para 822]
A key phrase in the above passage is set off by dashes. This act not only
expanded the definition of the term ADP, it also expanded the sphere of influence to
include contractors providing ADP sen ices to the Government. It virtually took in all
aspects of data processing from support to software and hardware.
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Additionally, GSBCA's jurisdiction was expanded by the PRRA to cover
procurements that were "subject to delegation" rather than merely those "conducted under
delegations" from GSA [Ref. 16:para 822]. The PRRA also gave permanent jurisdiction
over any ADPE protest resolution to the GSA Board of Contract Appeals [Ref. 9:p. 1-8].
Notably the PRRA specifically restated the procurements excluded from the Brooks Act
and GSBCA jurisdiction by virtue of the Warner Amendment provisions
[Ref. 17: para 824].
6. Summary of Legislation
The preceding Acts of Congress are only a feu acts that affect the acquisition
process. However, they were worth special note because of the impact they have had on
all Federal Agencies. Perhaps the most difficult aspect to understand is the number of
Federal Agencies, organizations, and offices that control and influence the ADP
acquisition process. The term "acquisition process," includes all phases from
requirements determination through disposal. Figure 2.1 is a diagram of those major
organizations that have regulatory responsibility and the agencies created to fulfill the
requirements of congressional legislation as discussed previously.
B. REGULATIONS
There are two primary Federal regulations affecting ADP procurement. They are the
FAR and the FIRMR. Although not technically classified as a regulation, OMB circulars
have the same impact as regulations. The DoD publishes a supplement to the FAR
known as DFARS. DoD also has numerous directives and instructions governing specific
areas of ADP acquisition (see Table 2.1). A short description of the major Federal
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1. Office of Management and Budget Circulars
The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) functions as the only entity
with executive branch-wide authority [Rcf 18:p. 67]. It publishes OMB circulars, OMB
bulletins, OFPP policy letters, and numerous other policy documents. OMB circulars are
Government-wide policy directives published by the OFPP. The policy documents direct
executive branch agencies in the implementation of congressional laws or presidential
policies. However, the OFPP docs not have exclusive policy making authority. That
authority is shared with GSA and the procuring agencies (i.e., DoD, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (NASA), etc.).
The OMB circulars that have major effects on ADP are OMB circulars A-76 and
A- 130.
a. OMB Circular A 76 : Policies for A cquiring Commercial or Industrial
Projectsfor Government I se
The principle of A-76 is that Government should not compete with its
citizens in producing goods and services, except when necessary for reasons of security,
financial control, or efficiency. The circular sets forth procedures for determining
whether commercial activities should be performed under contract with commercial
source-^ or m-housc using Go\crnment facilities and personnel [Rcf. 8:p. 9J. The circular
lists examples under Automatic Data Processing of the activities that should be
commercialized.
1. ADP Services -- batch processing, time-sharing, facility management;
2. Programming and systems analysis, design, development, and simulation;
3. Data entry, transmission, and teleprocessing sen ices;
4. Systems engineering and installation; and
5. Equipment installation, operation, and maintenance.
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b. OMB Circular A-l 30: Management ofFederal Information Resources
This circular prescribes a general policy framework, as required by the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, for "developing and implementing uniform and
consistent information resources management policies." It canceled four OMB circulars
and related transmittal memoranda to publish very specific responsibilities for Federal
Agencies such as [Rcf. 17J:
1
.
Departments of State, Commerce, Defense;
2. General Services Administration;
3. Office of Personnel Management;
4. National Archives and Records Administration; and
5. The Office of Management and Budget.
A thorough study of this document is not necessary for the correct application
of ADP/FIP acquisitions. The text and information of this circular are embodied in other
regulations such as the FIRMR, FAR and DFARS. Its existence should be acknowledged
and its impact understood.
2. FIRMR
The FIRMR is issued by the General Services Administration and "within policy
direction from the Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office o{ the President"
[Ref. 19: Foreword], Although the FIRMR is actually intended to supplement the FAR, in
situations where the FIRMR and the FAR appear to contradict one another, the FIRMR
takes precedence^ [Ref. 8:p. 9]. The FIRMR consolidates current GSA information
resource provisions into a single document [FIRMR, 1989, Foreword]. It governs: "the
•Announced in the Federal Register IS Max 198X
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acquisition, management, and use of ADP, telecommunications, ..., and is used in
conjunction with the FAR. ...the FIRMR should be the source of guidance in all
applicable cases" [Ref. 9: p. 1-10].
The FIRMR is codified into law as:
1. Title 41 - Public Contracts and Property Management;
2. Subtitle E - Federal Information Resources Management Regulations Systems;
3. Chapter 201 - Federal Information Resources Management Regulations.
There are four Subchapters to the FIRMR, each with its own scope.
1. Subchapter A - Topics o\' general interest such as applicability, authorities, and
definitions. (Parts 201-1 through 201-4).
2. Subchapter B - Discussion of considerations such as personal privacy, standards,
record keeping, and competition. (Parts 201-6 through 201-16)
3. Subchapter C - Includes topics of interest to senior officials and executives such
as budgeting, program management, GSA delegations of authority, and reporting
requirements. Also includes operational provisions such as management of
resources, sharing of resources, reuse of equipment, and use of GSA schedules.
(Parts 201-17 through 201-38).
4. Subchapter D - This part parallels FAR part 39; it consolidates all policies and
procedures unique to acquiring Government ADP and telecommunications
resources by contracting. (Part 201-39)
The FIRMR is supplemented with bulletins, temporary regulations and
amendments which arc published when necessary. Bulletins and published guidance
ha\c been the subject of protest at the GSBCA. The protests have brought into question
the binding and regulatory nature of such supplemental material on Government
procuring agencies. A new FIRMR, effective 29 April 91, states very clearly in the
opening Supplementary Information paragraph, that "The FIRMR bulletins arc not
regulatory; they provide guidance or detailed coverage of a subject ..." [Ref. 19].
The FIRMR and temporary regulations are contracting rules "with Governmcnt-
widc applicability and the force and effect of law " [Ref. 19:E\ec Summary]. However,
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the FIRMR only contains general acquisition regulations. The FIRMR subpart that
pertains to acquisition is for a special category of procurement and contracting
regulations. Generally, the FIRMR contracting'acquisition subparts deal with computer
security, evaluation factors, least cost and privacy matters. The FIRMR still must be used
in conjunction with the FAR. The FIRMR states: The policies and procedures ... (of the
FIRMR) ... are in addition to, not in lieu of, the FAR policies and procedures.
[Rcf 19: para 201-3.102]
3. FAR
The FAR is the pnmar\ regulation used by all Federal Agencies for the
acquisition of supplies and services with appropriated funds [Ref. 9:pl-10]. It is
principally concerned with the behavior, actions and procedures of the supplier
[Rcf. 18:p. 111]. The FAR deals with the mechanics of contracting vice strategy
formulation {Rcf. 20:p. 14], The FAR was issued by agreement between DoD, NASA and
GSA and is maintained by the Civilian Agency Acquisition Council (CAAC) and the
Defence Acquisition Review Council (DARC). See Figure 2.2. The OFPP, which
sponsored the drafting of the FAR, resolves controversies between agencies and the
councils over issuance o( FAR modifications.
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FIGURE 2.2. FAR COMMITTEES
Chapter 39 - Management, Acquisition, and Use of Information Resources -
provides contract and acquisition guidance applicable to ADP/FIP. Of special interest,
FAR Parts 6.204 and 19.8 outline requirements for use of the Small Business
Administration 8(a) Program. Contracting Officers can limit competition to eligible 8(a)
contractors without the requirements for justification or determinations and findings for
ADPE and other acquisitions.
4. DFARS
The F1RMR and the FAR alone are not sufficient references for ADP acquisition
within DoD. DFARS subpart 270 must also be conferred. Even though DFARS subpart
270 is an iteration of the F1RMR, it provides a "more complete and clearly written
(source) than any other single ADP instruction" [Ref. 15: A- 178]. This researcher agrees
with the "clearly written single source" statement made in the Small Purchase Handbook,
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but can not agree with "more complete." The fact still remains that both documents need
to be searched for applicable sections in the FIRMR and the DFARS before making an
ADPE purchase. The following subparts of DFARS are particularly useful:
1. Subpart 270.3 - Acquisitions under GSA Authority;
2. Subpart 270.4 - Acquisitions of ADPE exempted from GSA authority, specifically
- the Warner Amendment exceptions.
3. Subpart 270.13 - Sharing of computer resources and the software exchange
program.
4. Subpart 270. 14 - Reuse of computer equipment.
In addition to FAR, FIRMR, and DFARS, there is specific guidance promulgated
by DoD. Further, the Contracting Officer must also consult Service specific regulations
for guidance. The following Table 2.1 is a partial listing of DoD instructions and
directives that pertain to ADPE. All these must be considered to determine their
applicability in the ADP acquisition process.
TABLE 2.1.
DOD INS! RUCTIONS AND DIRECTIVES
DODI 500 .2 Delense Acquisition Management Policies and
Pnx;cdurcs
DODD 4160.19 DOD ADPE Reutilization Program
DODD 5200.28 Security Requirements for ADP
DODD 541 K). 1
1
DOD Privacy Program




DOD Information Resource Management (IRM)
Program
DODD 7920.1 Life Cycle Management of Automated Information
Systems (AIS)




DODD 7935. 1-S AIS Documentation Standards
DODI 7939.2 ADP Software Exchange
DODD 70S. \ i ADP Resources Management
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5. Other Regulations
There are numerous regulations published by each of the procuring Services and
Federal Agencies. The reader should be aware that there are Secretary of the Navy
Instructions, Naval Supply Systems Command Instructions, Naval Air Systems
Command Instructions, and Marine Corps Orders. They are too numerous and
voluminous to mention here. Each is usually more restrictive and adds more detail and
requirements to the process. For the purpose of this chapter, the researcher will not go
any further than Federal and DoD policies and regulations mentioned above.
6. Regulations Summary
In retrospect, there are only three major regulations governing the acquisition of
ADP/FIP. They are the FIRMR, the FAR, and the DFARS. There exist "countless" other
regulations, instructions, bulletins, circulars, transmittals, and amendments that effect the
ADP/FIP procurement process. Some are general in nature; others specialize in specific
ADPEareas.
The review of legislation and regulations is necessary to understanding the ADPE
procurement process. The precedence of regulations and the reason each of the
controlling organizations authored these documents is as important as the procuring
process. Sherman states that knowledge of rule making and policy development is
necessary because, "Rule making in Federal procurement receives almost more attention
than the acquisition of goods and services." [Ref. 18:p. 106].
C. ADPE PROCUREMENT PROCESS
The acquisition process for ADPE is unlike any other type of purchase.
The process of obtaining a new Automatic Data Processing system from the initial
planning stage to final installation for an activity is at best a complicated, time
consuming and often frustrating evolution. [Ref. 15: A- 164]
22
The researcher adds, understanding the regulations and interagency relationships without
attempting a purchase can be a frustrating process. You must start somewhere. That
"somewhere" is a thorough understanding of the requirements of the ADPE user. The
Contracting Officer's understanding of customer requirements will be assumed in this
research.
1. Determination of Brooks Act Applicability
Regardless of the size of the ADPE purchase, the Contracting Officer must
determine the applicability of the Brooks Act. The Warner Amendment defines the
exceptions to the Brooks Act for DoD. If the Brooks Act applies, the Contracting officer
becomes involved in the "world" of the GSA requirements, exceptions and delegations.
If the acquisition is exempt from the Brooks Act by the Warner Amendment exceptions,
the Contracting Officer is then guided by specific FAR, DFARS, DoD, and Service
component regulations. The method, process, and paths for acquisition will differ. The
GSA has vested procurement authority when contracting for ADPE, commercial
software, maintenance services and certain other sen ices and supplies not exempt by the
Warner Amendment.
2. GSA Jurisdictional Authority
The GSA exercises control over the procurement of ADP/FIP through the use of
a Delegation of Procurement Authority (DPA). The DPA is a written notification from
GSA that grants contracting authority to the DoD component [Rcf. 21:para 270.2-2]. The
DPA is received in response to an Agency Procurement Request (APR).
An APR must be submitted to GSA prior to the initiation of a GSA vested
contract action [Ref. 21:para 270.302-1], There are exceptions to the APR submission




GSA allows for regulatory delegations 1 or exceptions in four areas: equipment,
software, sen ices and support sen ices [Ref. 19:para 201-20.305.1]. Regulatory
Delegation authority can be found in FIRMR 201-20.305 and DFARS 270.302. A
regulator) DPA is given to agencies w ith procurement authority. The agency must have
review procedures at least as stringent as GSA's procedures [Ref. 9:p. 4-2]. If a
regulatory delegation exists, then an APR is not required. The new FIRMR significantly
simplified the definition of regulatory delegation verses the blanket delegation. Now,
there are only two dollar thresholds to be concerned with versus the eight previous
thresholds. The following list is a synopsis of regulatory authority :
1. The contract life cost is less than $2.5 million, for FIP equipment, software,
sen ices, and support senices, or
a) is less than $250,000 for specific make & model requirements, or
b) is less than $250,000 for sole-source procurements.
2. The contract involves the acquisition of telecommunications senices wi hin the
scope of GSA's FTS 2000 contract.
3. The contract is for ADP/FIP related supplies regardless of^ cost.
4. The contract is a software order against a GSA Requirements Contract or Schedules
Contract. [Ref. 17: para. 201-20.305-1]
4. Specific Delegations
Other exceptions, if not allowed for by the regulatory delegation, are allowed for
by GSA on a case-by-case basis. The case-by-case delegations are called "specific
delegations." The request for specific delegation is submitted when an agency's planned
' A "regulator) delegation" was known prior to the new FIRMR as a "blanket delegation" of
procurement authority.
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procurement exceeds the limitations of GSA's regulatory delegation or procurement
authority [Rcf. 8:p. 11]. In order to get a specific delegation, the Service component must
submit an APR and receive a DPA from GSA.
5. GSA Response to APR
GSA, after receipt, review, and approval of the APR has three options. It can:
1. delegate authority to the agency,
2. delegate authority with GSA participation, or
3. make the procurement for the agency. [Ref. 9: p. 4-7]
GSA will take action in 20 workdays on the APR. At the end of 20 days, the
DFARS states: "Upon expiration of the 20-workday period plus 5 calendar days for mail
bag, {if no answer has been received} the DoD component may proceed with the
acquisition as if a DPA had. in fact, been granted" [Ref. 21:para 270.303-2].
In the event that the third option is chosen by GSA, the DoD component and
procuring agency effect a procurement as a joint venture with the GSA. The DoD
component prepares all documentation, conducts solicitation and selection, debnefs and
administers the contract, whereby, GSA actually awards the contract to the lowest overall
cost contractor.
6. Schedule Contract
The schedule contracts are negotiated, noncompetitive contracts between the
GSA and a vendor. The vendor guarantees that the prices shown in the schedule contract
will be equal to or less than the prices offered to the vendor's most favored commercial
customers [Rcf. 22:App. B-l]. A Contracting Officer can place an order against the
schedule contract subject to a Maximum Order Limit (MOL). A MOL is based on dollar
value and quantity limits. The delivery order cannot exceed a $300,000 purchase price or
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ten different and separately priced Hems. If the Contracting Officer plans to exceed these
limits, he she must request authority from GSA to use the schedule contracts
[Ret. 22:App. B-2],
The use of the schedule contract is not mandatory. The terms "schedule
contract" and "non-mandatory schedules" arc synonymous. Schedule contracts can be
found in DFARS 270.313 and 270.314.
The existence of non-mandatory ADP schedules docs not eliminate the
requirement for competition. The rapid change in prices explains the need to ensure
that competition is still sought in spite of existing non-mandatory ADP schedules.
[Rcf. 15:A-171]
The DoD Inspector General's (IG) Audit Report, 1985. (No. 85-113), noted
several problems related to the use of schedule contracts. Schedule contracts are a good
source o\' ADP/FIP, software and services if the Contracting Officer is familiar with their
applicability. Some applications that the IG Audit noted as problems due to
misunderstanding of schedule contracts are:
1. Schedule prices arc negotiated on a non-competitive basis.
2. Onlv commercially available software is earned on schedule contracts.
3. Schedule contracts offer both commercial items and specialized items meeting
Government requirements.
7. Requirements Contracts
The GSA also has requirements contracts. The Contracting Officer must order
against the requirements contract, if the item he is procuring is on the GSA requirements
list. This is mandator) ! Orders placed against a requirements contract are considered a
competitive contract, because the requirements contract awarded by GSA was
competitive [Rcf. 22:App. B-2].
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8. Agency Requirements Contracts
Another method of obtaining data processing equipment is by having an Agency
establish its own requirements contract [Ref. 22:p. 2J. In order for an agency to establish
its own requirements contract, it must receive a DPA from the GSA. The requirements
contract negotiated by the agency must be competitive. Thereafter, all other activities
within the agenc\ can place delivery orders against the contract and obtain the items at
competitive prices.
An agency requirements contract will provide a lower price than a schedule
contract and will eliminate the need and time required for negotiating a separate
contract each time items are needed. [Ref. 22:App. B-2J
An agency requirements contract, if authorized, seems to provide a GSA sanctioned
method of avoiding procurement through GSA. The GAO believes this provides a cost
efficient method of procurement.
9. GSA ADP/FIF Acquisition Summary
The GSA has established five methods to procure general data processing
equipment and services. They include:
1
.
The Regulatory Delegation for competitive and non-competitive procurements,
2. The Specific Delegation for procurements above threshold limits established foi
regulator) delegations.
3. Deliver) orders against GSA Schedule Contracts (non-mandatory),
4. Dcliverv orders against GSA Requirements Contracts (mandatory), and
5. Agency or Service established competitive Requirements Contracts
Thus far, this chapter has addressed the legislation, regulations and GSA methods
of procurement. But this is not the end of the discussion. Methods of procurement do not
equate to sources of procurement.
The five GSA methods of procurement above are not the preferred "source." In
fact, the transfer of Government-owned ADP/FIP amongst Government agencies is
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preferred prior to the acquisition from established commercial sources. (Established
commercial sources include those identified as part of the five GSA procurement
methods). Open market procurement is the third "source" in order of preference to 1)
Government transfers, and 2) commercial sources. In other words, in order of acquisition
preference of general ADP/F1P, Government transfers is first, followed by the preference
for commercial sources, then procurement from the open market. Open market
procurement methods include sealed bid, or negotiated small purchase contracts by
agencies other than GSA. This research would be incomplete without the discussion of
Government transfer programs and open market purchases.
10. Government Transfer
Sharing and reutilization of computer resources are defined in DFARS 270.13
and 270.14. The DFARS states quite clearly that
DoD components shall not initiate the process oi selection and acquiring resources
unless it has made a reasonable effort to determine that the required capability cannot
be met economically and efficiently bv using existing resources on a shared basis.
[Ref. 2 l:para 270.1302]
Government transfers can be obtained by:
1
.
Outnght reassignment 'transfer of ADP/FIP, or
2. Sharing of computer time with other Government activities and agencies, or
3. Use of the GSA Information Technology Fund (ITF).
The ITF is supported by Congress with small amounts of funds on an irregular basis and
the collection of sen ice charges by GSA [Ref 4:p. 6-4]. It appears unlikely that DoD
components will have favorable access to this fund.
GSA and DoD maintain lists o[ Government-owned and Government-leased
ADPE available for reassignment. Also, GSA and DoD publishes bulletins containing
information with ADP sharing opportunities. Sharing arrangements are made directly
with the acquiring and providing agencies [Ref. 9:p. 6-3]. Both of these lists are lengthy
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and burdensome. However, the Contracting Officer must certify that the requirements
cannot be filled through sharing or reutilization before a procurement can go forward
[Ref. 19:201-31]. Additionally, the Contracting Officer must keep in mind the
requirements regarding sole-source procurement when acquiring Government-leased
ADPE.
The transfer of Government-owned ADPE is not a procurement. The transfer of
Government-leased ADPE is considered a sole-source procurement and must be
justified. [Ref. 9:p. 6-3]
11. Open Market Contracts
Open market procurement is used when either the "GSA-five" commercial
sources or Government transfer sources cannot meet the ADP/FIP requirement [GSA
Training Center, 1990:p. 6-8]. Open market procurement is one of the three sources of
procurements as opposed to a method of procurement. Open market procurements are
small purchase contracts (sealed bid or negotiated) not requiring a DPA from GSA.
Howe\er, approval and certifications are required for any ADP/FIP services
procurements. The certifications state that the procuring officer has complied with
applicable laws and regulations, that the ADPE requirement could not be filled via
reutilization or sharing, and that ADP life-cycle costs were approved by appropriate
authority [Ref. 15:A-172].
The provisions o\~ DFARS part 213 (Small Purchase and other Simplified
Purchase Procedures) apply when the aggregate amount of the procurement is not over
$25,000 annually or not over $25,000 for the life-cycle cost of the item. This is referred
to as a "small purchase." In this case, the small purchase, procedures of FAR 13 and
DFARS 213 apply. The Certifications and Approvals (C&A) are still required.
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D. SUMMARY
This chapter described the more important legislation, regulations, and process for
acquiring ADP/F1P resources. This researcher has found that there are many other areas
to understand in the acquisition of ADPE and ADP services. For example, this researcher
did not attempt to determine synopsis requirements, publicizing of contract action
requirements, software acquisition requirements, GSA teleprocessing requirements, or
several other very important considerations for an ADP acquisition. In conclusion, the
researcher has found the system to be complex and convoluted. The field of ADPE
acquisition lends credence to the need for an agency to organize its buying structure
around commodities. If not for all commodities, then in the very least a buyer should
specialize in ADPE as a commodity. There are too many special rules that apply to ADPE
uniquely.
Fortunately, GSA has assistance programs provided by the Office of Technical
Assistance (OTA). Two offices within OTA that may be useful are the Office of
Software Development and Information Technology (OSDIT) and the Federal System
Integration and Management Center (FEDSIM). As the name implies, OSDIT offers
assistance in software related matters. FEDSIM provides technical assistance in
designing, procuring, managing and operating information systems and information
technology [Rcf. 9:p. 6-12].
The importance of thorough, adequate planning cannot be overlooked in the
ADP/FIP acquisition process. A course of action should be mapped out with the
customer; they should be made to understand the unique Governmental and regulatory
requirements prior to the purchase and delivery of ADP. Most likely, they will not be
satisfied with the many roadblocks to purchasing "their" computer or the time delays that
are inherent in this svstem.
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The system just described is by far not an efficient and economic method of
procurement. The adherence to the statutes and regulations and prcx-edures ha\ e been
challenged in courts, boards, and other protest forums. The next chapter will present the
forums for protesting an alleged agency violation.
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III. BID PROTEST FORUMS FOR FEDERAL INFORMATION
PROCESSING
A. BACKGROUND
There are many alternatives for an unsuccessful offeror today. Poor to 1940 this was
not true. The US Supreme Court at that time held that statutes and regulations were
intended to protect the Government, not contract bidders. [Ref. 23:p.533] In 1970, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court established new direction for bid protests in its
reasoning that unsuccessful bidders "have the incentive to bring suit to compel agencies
[to] follow the regulations which control Government contracting." [Ref. 23:p.534].
Since this ruling, a whole new body of law and new forums were established and evolved
to hear and judge bid protest cases.
In 1983, despite low bid protest reversal rates in both the GAO and Federal Courts,
contractors found it advantageous to pursue all available remedies. [Ref. 24:p.2] The
protestor accomplishes several objectives even if he subsequently loses the decision; he
can dela\ or stop altogether the procurement, he can gain information about the award
process and possibly gain access to commercially sensitive information about a
competitor, and he may also establish an advantageous position for subsequent hearings
and decisions if the protest is timed correctly.
A bid protestor has several options available to him. The Contracting Officer can
expect that the protestor will choose the forum most advantageous to him and least
advantageous to the Government procuring agency. For this reason, the Contracting
Officer may find himself in a number of different bid protest resolution forums. See
Figure 3. 1 for a schematic of ADP/'FIP bid protest forums and the paths for appeal. The
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forums, for the purposes of this chapter, will be divided into three categories: 1)
Legislative, 2) Administrative, and 3) Judicial. The Administrative forum consists of
both an informal process and a formal process. The informal process is a protest with the
procuring agency's Contracting Officer. The formal process is a protest with any one of
the agency Boards authorized by Congress (administrative). The Legislative and Judicial
forums are always formal processes.
U.S. SUPREME COURT















1. Eiitry Level Forums for Protest
2. M-y Nor Be ih GSBCA & GAO simultaneously
FIGl RE 3.1. ADP/F1P BID PROTEST FORI MS
B. ADMINISTRATIVE FORUMS
The administrative forums include the procuring agency's Contracting Officer or
higher authority. This forum also includes agency boards of contract appeals such as the
Armed Sen ices Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) for the DoD or the GSBCA for the
GSA and ADP/FIP related acquisitions.
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The judges on a Board are appointed by the agency, such as DoD, for the ASBCA.
This particular agency board has demonstrated considerable independence from DoD
influence. [Ref 5, p.335] The ASBCA will not be discussed further because this board
does not fall within the context of the purpose of this chapter - namely "bid protest
forums for Federal information processing (HP)" 1
The administrative forums to be discussed are the procuring agency and the GSBCA.
The legislative forum to be discussed is the GAO's Comptroller General's procedures.
There is a difference that should be emphasized here. "Board decisions are considered
final unless appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit within 120
days." [Ref. 25:p. 133] GAO decisions are only advisory.
1. Procuring Agency Contracting Officer
This is logically the first person or agent that would be notified in the case of a
bid protest. To protest here in this administrative forum is merely asking the agency to
reconsider an earlier position in a Solicitation, Specification, Evaluation, or award.
Statistics arc not available regarding the number of protests lodged at the agency level.
However, as an indication of the popularity and the number of protests that are resolved
at this lc\el, the researcher turns to the GSBCA statistics.
Of all protests filed with the GSBCA since January 1985 through March 1991,
61.99? have been either withdrawn- by the protestor or settled^ at the agency level
*FIP is the new preferred acronym vice the previous term ADPE for Automatic Data Processing
Equipment with the release of the revised FIRMR
^Protests that are terminated without a Board hearing and the agency did not change its position, but
may have persuaded the protestor that the agency was essentially correct.
-The protestor and the agency resolved their issue(s) without a Board hearing, usually the protestor
achieved at least some of his initial objectives.
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[Ref. 26:p. 21]. This is indicative of the fact that many of the formally filed protests are
resolved at the agency level without the benefit of a formal hearing with the Board.
Of 17,128 General Purpose Automatic Data Processing Equipment acquisition
actions in 1990 [Ref. 27:p.9], there were only 250 formal protests with the GSBCA [Ref.
28:p. 23]. Approximately 1.57c of all reported Government ADP/FIP procurement
actions were formally protested. Other figures indicate as few as 0.47c of all computer-
related procurements have been protested through the GSBCA [Ref. 29:p48]. Still other
statistics indicate that as high as 4.37c ADP procurements are formally protested
[Ref. 30:p 14]. Although each of these statistics is arguable as to the application, source
and validity, they lead to the same general conclusions.
1
.
There are relatively few formal ADP/FIP protests; and
2. Of the formal protests, many are resolved at the agency level without a formal
protest filing; and
3. Given the perceptions cited in Chapter I, a greater majority (large percentage) of
protests are never formally filed, but are resolved at the agency level.
If a potential contractor or interested party elects to use this forum, he must
follow the varying procedures of all the various Government procuring agencies.
However, there is not a requirement that a protestor must file his complaint with the
agenc\ before filing with any other forum [Ref. 31:Cir. 1970]. The protestor can in fact
have an informal and a formal protest pending simultaneously [Ref. 12:para 759(h)(6)].
2. GSBCA
The 1984 CICA amended the Brooks Act 1 . The amendment gave the GSBCA
. . . jurisdiction over a protest filed by an interested party alleging a violation of a
statute or regulation in connection with any procurement conducted by the General
Sen ices Administration under the Brooks Act. [Ref. 32;p. 121]
1 Public Law No.89-306, 79 Stat 1127 ( 1965)
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This includes challenges for computer equipment and services acquired under the
Brooks Act by DoD. The GSBCA did not gain exclusive jurisdiction in bid protests for
FIP. A protestor still has the option of filing a claim with either GAO or GSBCA and the
Federal Courts system. If the protestor chooses the administrative or legislative forum
over the judicial forum, the FIP protestor must choose between the GAO or GSBCA. A
protest cannot be filed/pending at the GAO or GSBCA concurrently. However, the
protestor is not stopped from filing suit in the Federal Courts system at any time. He may
have a protest filed with the administrative or legislative forum and concurrently with a
judicial forum.
a. Jurisdiction
The subject of jurisdiction is usually not considered a subject for Contracting
Officers and is left for the pen iew of legal assistance. However, the determination of
GSBCA jurisdiction is tantamount to determining whether an ADP/FIP acquisition is
subject to the Brooks Act. For this reason, the subject of jurisdiction must be examined
here. Jurisdiction is a very broad topic and has been examined extensively by the legal
profession and is subject to a continual debate. The prevailing issues from this
researcher's point of view revolve around interpretations of the Brooks Act and Warner
Amendments. Appendix A is a reproduction of the pertinent sections of the Brooks Act
as amended by the Warner Act and the PRRA.
The Board has continually sought to expand its sphere of influence in
ADP/FIP acquisitions. The Board's interpretations of The Brooks Act and Warner
amendments has served the Board's purpose to "consistently expand and broaden its
jurisdiction." [Rcf 2:p. 1 1 ;Ref . 33:p. 23-24J. The DPA, Significant Use of ADP/FIP,
incidental performance, and ADP/FIP definitions are continually evolving with new
Board case decisions.
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(!) Delegation of Procurement Authority. As stated earlier, because an
agency did not obtain a GSA DPA docs not exclude the agency from the reach of either
Brooks or the GSBCA. The Paperwork Reduction Reauthorization Act of 1986 provided
the Board with the statutory ability to include any ADP/FIP acquisitions that may "be
subject to delegation." [Rcf 16:para 824]. If an agency conducts a procurement that is
later determined to be subject to Brooks, then the Board can order the award to be
terminated and force the agency to obtain a DPA [Ref. 34].
(2) Brooks/Warner Jurisdictional Issues. (Important Examples)
Military test equipment was subject to Brooks because it was
commercially available and was not "an integral part" of the weapon system. Warner did
not apply because the test equipment was not mission essential [Ref. 35;Ref. 32:p. 123].
Military training equipment (such as the F14D trainer) is subject to
Brooks because it was not "crucial to accomplishing a specific military mission." It
should be noted that there was a dissenting opinion that felt the military mission cannot
be accomplished without training and therefore this procurement was exempt under
Warner. [Rcf. 36].
A weapon system with a computer as an integral part is not subject to
Brooks. A protested computer procurement in support of the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SD1) was determined not to be within the jurisdiction of the Board due to the Warner
exemptions. The protestor then argued, the procurement violated the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) treaty and therefore could not be called a weapon system. The Board
dismissed the protest as "overly technical" [Ref. 37;Ref. 2:p 13].
Functionality (use) max determine Brooks application . A military
procurement oi' facsimile machines to be used with law enforcement officials for the
"drug war" was exempt from Brooks. The machines were to be used to share intelligence
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by DoD for its countcrnarcotics mission. [Ref. 38;Ref 2:p. 13]. Essentially, equipment,
even though commercially available and not an integral part of a weapon system, may be
exempi from the Brooks Act. The determination was dependent on the facsimile
machines use for a specific DoD mission.
General purpose, off-the-shelf equipment is not pertinent to the
determination of Brooks. The Board in this case looked to the primary intended purpose
of the procurement. Even though ruggedized magnetic disks were commercially
available, the disks were to be used as an integral part of a weapon system. 1 [Ref.
39:p.l8]. Therefore, the magnetic disk procurement was Warner Amendment exempted
from the Books Act and GSA involvement.
Political environment may have an impact on the Brooks determination.
Comp.iter-controllcd security systems are subject to Brooks because they are based on
"microprocessor technology" [Ref. 40;Rei. 2:p. 12]. However, an intrusion detection
security system was not Brooks because it was at a time (during the Persian Gulf War)
when a "Congressional!} mandated program to defend against military threats is a
military mission." This was not a "general" base security system. Rather, it was a
specific mission to protect planes and weapons during a high threat environment of
terrorism [Ref. 41]. The second case cited here may have turned differently had the
political environment been different, i.e., the same system may have been considered a
general base security system using ADP/FIP and hence subject to Brooks.
(3) Significant Use/Incidental Performance. "Significant use" [Ref. 7:para
759(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II)] of ADP/FIP is a term that has become concurrently synonymous and
antonymous with the Brooks Act term of "incidental to the performance" [Ref. 7:para
'Case cited is GSBCA 9445-P. See also GSBCA 9469-P, GSBCA 9471 -P. GSBCA 9207, and
GSBCA 9243-P.
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759(a)(3)(A)] of a contract. Significant use refers to the use of ADP/FIP in the
performance of a service or in providing a product that is either performed or produced.
ADP/FIP that is incidental to the performance of a contract is not subject to Brooks.
However, if the ADP/FIP is "significant" it is subject to Brooks. Significant use is called
out more than incidental performance by the Board. Significant use expands the power of
the Board while incidental performance restricts their power.
The Board has stated that if ADP/FIP "were truly incidental, there would
be no need to mention it in the solicitation or the contract as awarded" 1 [Ref. 39:p.l4].
Several recent cases have challenged the element of significant use/incidental
performance.
The use of a dollar percentage as a judging factor for determining
significant use is an "unacceptable formulation" [Ref. 42]. On the other hand, the new
FIRMR establishes both a dollar threshold and percentage for determining significant use.
Significant use of FIP resources, among other things, means that:
. . . dollar value of FIP resources expended by the contractor to perform the
service or furnish the product is expected to exceed $500,000 of 207c of the estimated
cost of the contract, whichever amount is lower. fRef. 19:para 201-1.002-1]
Emphasis on data systems experience in the solicitation will call for a
judgment of significant use [Ref. 43].
The contract need not be primarily for A DP FIP. A contract for
construction of a building that involved in part the installation of a security system was
subject to Brooks. The ADP/FIP cost and function portion of the contract was deemed
significant. This was despite "The fact that installing the ADPE system [security system]
also involvefd] a considerable amount of costly construction ..." [Ref. 40].
•Case cited is GSBCA 9108 P
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A contract for reports is not considered significant use of ADP, it is
therefore only incidental. The Government contracted for information/reports not for
ADP/FIP. The Board noted the contractor may opt to use ADP/FIP in the performance of
the contract but was not required by the terms of the solicitation [Ref. 44].
A contract for data input services is incidental, and therefore not
considered significant. "The services being acquired [computer-aided design input
services] ... use ADPE, but are not themselves data processing services" [Ref. 45].
Operation of a computer system (i.e., a computer services contract) is not
significant use of ADP/FIP [Ref. 46]. The written opinion of the Board provides an
excellent summary of the meaning of "significant use."
. . .we have held that 'significance' in the use of ADPE 'does not connote
exclusivity, it merely requires importance or consequence.' ... In applying this test, we
have held that even where ADP services are not the primary item being acquired, if
they are a significant part of what is being procured, the procurement as a whole is
subject to the Brooks Act. ... We have also made it clear, however, that requirements
for sen ices which use ADPE but do not involve ADP support or maintenance - such
as secretarial services which entail the use of word processors - are not to be
construed as involving the significant use of ADPE. ... The mere entering, accessing,
and deleting of data into an existing automated data base, and manipulation of that
information by invoking pre-programmed commands, is insufficient to bring a
procurement within the ambit of the Brooks Act. [Ref. 46]
(4) Definition of ADPE. A continuation of the same topic above, significant
use/incidental performance, in a slightly different vein is the Brooks Act, as amended,
definition of ADPE. The Act is very specific as to what is included and what is not
included in the description of ADPE (see Appendix A). That however, has not prevented
the topic from being an issue of litigation before the Board. Decisions by the Board have
provided some of the following interpretations.
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Radar, sonar, radio or television equipment is exempt from the Brooks
Act [Ref. 7:para 759(a)(3)(B)]. The Board's strict interpretation of this clause is evident
in stating that the "four items excluded from Brooks Act's definition of ADPE are an all
inclusive list" [Ref. 47].
Physical storage of ADP/FIP data does not constitute an ADP/FIP
procurement. Here the Board stated that a contract for warehouse space for storage of
ADP/FIP is not within their jurisdiction. The "warehouse will store the tapes, which will
store the data; the warehouse does not store the data." [Ref. 48].
Reports if received via an electronic means are subject to Brooks. The
Board appears to have contradicted itself with Sector Technologies [Ref. 46] and
Cryptek, Inc. [Ref. 38] cited earlier regarding contracts for reports and data services. The
contract was primarily for aviation services to be used in the drug war; whereby the
contractor would provide, among other things, on-line access to the contractor's
automated data reporting system. The Board found that the reports and services were an
integral part of the contract. Albeit, an interesting dissent is voiced and is well worth
repeating. Judge Hendlcy stated that he believed "the contract is for aviation services
with a requirement to maintain records relating to the contract performance..." He further
stated:
The use of ADPE has become nigh all pervasive in a modern technological
society. A trip through the checkout counter of a grocery store involves tabulations
and print-outs made by expensive ADPE. Is one buying groceries or an ADPE
service? ... I would conclude that ADPE requirements relating to contract record
keeping are 'incidental to the performance of a Federal contract', else we will be
letting the 'tail wag the dog.' [Ref. 49]
In fact, this case decision was previous to Sector Technologies [Ref. 46] and Cryptek,
Inc. [Ref. 38]. These two cases taken in actual chronology may indicate a willingness of
the Board to accept the "pervasiveness of ADPE in a modern technological society."
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The term "radio" as part of the exclusion to Brooks "does not include
microwave or satellite fradiol transmissions." The Board narrowly interpreted Brooks
when it suited its expansionary objectives. The Board's justification stated that "the term
radio in the exception refers to the application of radio technology to the broadcast media
and not to the use of radio technology for satellite transmissions for the movement of data
between computer systems." [Ref. 50].
b. Timeliness
The issue of timeliness is not necessarily a jurisdictional issue, but if the
protest is not "timely" the Board will refuse to hear the protest. Rule 5 of the GSBCA
Rules of Procedures defines timeliness. The Board interprets the timeliness requirements
more liberally than the GAO. A GSBCA Judge has stated that his interpretation is
sufficiently more liberal than the GAO's, that "attorney's are wasting their time when they
cite GAO decisions" [Ref. 32:p. 137]. Rule 5 indicates three situations under which a
protest will be determined timely.
1. Improprietous solicitations must be protested prior to the bid opening or closing
time for proposals, or
2. Ten days after the basis for protest is known or should have been known, or
3. Within ten davs of adverse agencv action on a procuring agencv level protest. [Ref.
51:p. 1-18]
The Board has construed its timeliness rules strictly [Ref. 39:p.27]. Indeed, a
protest alleging an impropriety in the solicitation was untimely because it was filed six
minutes after the closing time for receipt of proposals 1 [Ref. 39: p. 28]. A more recent
protest was untimely because the whole protest was not received before the deadline. The
'Case cited is GSBCA 9387-P
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first page of a protest sent by facsimile was one minute early. The complete text was not
received until after the closing time for receipt of offers (applies to protests challenging
terms of solicitation only) [Ref. 52].
c. Interested Party
For a protestor to have "standing" with the Board to pursue a protest they
must be an "interested party." Statute defines interested party as "an actual or prospective
bidder or offeror whose direct economic interest would be affected by the award of the
contract or by failure to award the contract" [Ref. 7:para 759(f)(9)(B)]. The intent to bid
is not sufficient grounds for being an interested party [Ref. 53]. As stated in ADP PR
VII/N3: "if a party does not submit a proposal by the closing date for receipt of proposal,
that party does not have standing to protest any aspect of the procurement action."
Furthermore, only the second-lowest bidder gains interested party status
[Ref. 54]. A Federal Circuit Court limited who may gain interested party status and
thereby reduced the Board's jurisdictional reach. However, the Board regained some of
its jurisdiction on July 20, 1990. The Board decided that the second-lowest bidder
standing applied to sealed-bid procurements only. It does not apply to negotiated
procurements. Since the Board or agency may find it necessary to modify a solicitation,
the second-lowest bidder cannot be determined directly [Ref. 55].
d. Decisions
The GSBCA issues binding opinions for all Federal agencies regarding
acquisition of FIP. The opinions can be appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
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Federal Circuit. Since the GSBCA is part of the Executive Branch of Government, there
is not a problem of constitutionality with GSBCA decisions as discussed below in GAO
decisions 1 .
GSBCA has ruled that it will not give deference to the agency's decision like
that of the GAO. [Ref. 56:p.73] As noted by an American Bar Association report, the
GSBCA is not hesitant to substitute its judgment for that of an agency official [Ref. 2:p.
ll;Ref.33:p. 36-39].
Further, the GSBCA's burden of proof upon the protestor is relaxed. The
Board stated very early its position in deciding protests brought before it:
[W]e decline to impose upon protestors the 'heavy burden' to show a 'clear and
prejudicial' violation of law. All that is required by the CICA, and all that will be
required here, is a showing of a violation of a statute, regulation, or delegation of
procurement authority. 2 [Ref. 2:p.ll]
The GSBCA requires only a preponderance of evidence that there has been a
violation of a statute, regulation, or delegation of authority [Ref. 56:p. 73]. This means
that an agency is not presumed to be correct.
The Board will normally issue its final decision within forty-five working
days after a protest is filed.
e. Discovery
This forum allows a comprehensive discovery process. Discovery in GSBCA
includes depositions and interrogatories by both the contracting agency and the protestor.
GSBCA may issue subpoenas to get documents to aid discovery. Probably the single
most GSBCA procedure subject to abuse is the discovery process. All interested parties
can obtain information that was not available to them prior to the protest. Some of this
'For a further discussion of the constitutionality issues involved in GAO and GSBCA decisions see
Public Contract Law Journal, Vol 15, No. 2, May 1985
2Case cited is GSBCA 7702-P
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information may fall into the category of proprietary. The Board makes a determination
regarding what must be disclosed. Discovery will be allowed for the "expeditious, fair,
and reasonable resolution of the protest." [Ref. 32:p. 141 J This can be successfully
argued by the protestor to allow him access to sensitive information. Fortunately,
discovery also works in the favor of both parties. It may lead to a better understanding of
the dispute and a subsequent resolution without Board intervention.
/ Stay Authority
The Board has the authority under CICA to issue a "stay" for both pre-award
and post-award protests. A stay is similar to an injunction or temporary restraining order.
A stay by the GSBCA suspends, revises, or revokes the procurement authority of a GSA
DPA. (A DPA is the authority granted by the GSA to a procuring agency for acquiring
FIP). The Board must hold a hearing on the question of a temporary suspension of
procurement authority. To gain a suspension of procurement authority (stay), the protest
must be filed prior to award or within 10 calendar days of award [Ref. 7:para 759(0(2)
and (3)]. The Contracting Officer's defense is an "urgently compelling need." Unlike in
the GAO forum, the Contracting Officer cannot override a stay decision by the Board.
The protestor, in order for a stay to be granted, must demonstrate .."irreparable injury if
the stay is not granted, ... no substantial harm to interested parties, ... and no harm to the
public interest " [Ref. 32:p. 155].
g. Analysis
Congress favors the actions of the GSBCA. This is indicative of the
permanent status it was granted in 1988. The GSBCA has gained a reputation as an
enforcer of competition. This is not only looked upon favorably by Congress but also by
protestors. In the period from Jan '85 to Sep '90, 493% of the protest cases filed with the
GSBCA were either granted or settled (presumed satisfactorily to protestor). Only 25.3%
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of the protest cases were dismissed or denied [Ref 57]. Remaining cases were
withdrawn. A Contracting Officer arguing a protest at the GSBCA should be well
prepared to defend his position. The tools of discovery' and stay and the Board's
application of proof requirements are generally in favor of the protestor. This is not to
say that a Contracting Officer will always lose. But, if he intends on having a reasonable
chance of "winning," he had better spend an adequate amount of preparation time during
the award process in documenting his decisions. In fact, it was near unanimous in the
researcher's telephone interviews, that the biggest impact that the GSBCA has had on
ADP/FIP procurement procedures is the necessity to document every element of the
procurement.
C. LEGISLATIVE FORUM
The only legislative body for bid protest and contract disputes is the GAO. This is an
arm of Congressional power, and thus must be kept separate from Executive power.
1. GAO
a. Authority
The GAO's Comptroller General's authority to resolve bid protests did not
come from a particular statute. The jurisdiction evolved out of the GAO's "statutory
authority to settle public accounts." [Ref. 56:p. 69] The GAO, lacking any specific grant
of authority, is merely a legislative body whose decisions are not binding on the
procuring agency. The decisions of the GAO are "recommendations." The agency may
disregard the GAO recommendation, but is required to notify the GAO of its intent. The
GAO, in turn, must inform Congress [Ref. 2:p. 17]. If the Contracting Officer chooses to
not follow the advice of the Comptroller General, he may be held "personally liable for a
payment made on an improperly awarded contract" [Ref. 5:p. 262]. The GAO being a
legislative body acting in stead of Congress and not the Judicial Branch (nor the
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Executive Branch) cannot invoke an injunction or Temporary' Restraining Order (TRO).
This is something only a Federal court can do. The CICA, in 1984, codified the authority
of the GAO to hear bid protests. However, this did not change the legislative stature of
the GAO. GAO in response to constitutionality criticism of its new codified authority
stated that its "protest decisions would continue to be recommendations, not binding
decisions and the GAO would not be able to order an agency to take specific action."
[Ref. 58:p. 182] CICA further granted the GAO "staying" authority. The stay authority
is automatic if a protest is filed prior to award or within 10 calendar days. This gave
GAO power to suspend award or performance of contracts that are pending resolution.
Other than semantics, this is essentially the same as a court ordered injunction or TRO.
b. Timeliness
The protest can be filed with the GAO during the solicitation process if the
basis for the protest is apparent. Otherwise, it must be filed within 10 working davs after
the basis for the protest is "known or should have been known." Note the difference in
requirements for an automatic stay of 10 calendar days and timeliness of 10 working
days. It is possible to have a timely filed protest but not be granted an automatic stay by
the GAO.
c. Decision Making
The GAO is required to issue a decision within 90 working days of the
protest filing. There is an "express option" whereby the procedural process will be
shortened to 45 days. The GAO prefers this method, but it must be agreed upon by all
concerned parties to the protest. [Ref. 59:p. 140] Again, the GAO's decisions are only
recommendations — they are not binding.
A major difference between the GSBCA and GAO is in the decision making
process. In its decisions, the GAO does give deference to the agency's opinion [Ref. 55:p.
47
73], unlike the GSBCA. This means that the procuring agency is presumed correct. The
GAO further imposes upon the protestor the burden of proof of "clear and convincing"
evidence of a procurement violation [Ref. 56:p. 73] and that the agency action is
arbitrary, unreasonable or an abuse of discretion [Ref. 33:p. 10-12].
GAO decisions are based on the written record submitted before it. There is
no opportunity for ascertaining disputed facts [Ref. 5:p. 267]. Because of the "clear and
convincing" evidence rule, the GAO has been under exceedingly increasing criticism by
procurement interests (lawyers, commercial firms, and congress). This forum is going
through some slow changes that may transform the face of decision rules more in favor of
competition and consequently the protestor. As part of the changes, a discussion of
discovery and protective order will follow.
The GAO may refer a protest case to the claims court in areas where it has
decided it does not have jurisdiction. Usually, this applies to cases involving
constitutionality or criminal and tort cases. Also, the GAO will not normally hear protest
cases involving subcontractors. There are exceptions however. The GAO will not refuse
a protest case involving a cost reimbursement contract where refusal would be prejudicial
to the Government.
d. Discovery
The GAO did not have a discovery mechanism like that of the GSBCA until
after 1988. Protestors used the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to obtain necessary
information for protests. FOIA requests were usually slow and the response could be




On April 1, 1991, GAO's revised bid protest rules took effect. A major
change in the discovery process involves "protective order." A protestor's in- house
corporate counsel will be able to receive proprietary data and other useful confidential
information. [Ref. 59:p. 115] The protestor's only requirement to receive this
information is that he submit affidavits indicating that the information will be protected
and safeguarded against disclosure to other parts of the corporation. This researcher
believes it is naive to think that the in-house counsel will separate his interests from that
of his corporate paycheck writer.
f. Analysis
GAO, is probably the most "friendly" forum for a Contracting Officer to find
himself in. But, the GAO protest process is changing. Thirty percent of the protest cases
were either sustained or corrective action was advised. Seventy percent were either
denied, disposed or withdrawn during 1990' . Between the period of 1978 through 1982,
only five to six percent of protests filed were sustained. [Ref. 24: p. 2] The researcher
suspects that the Government will "lose" more cases in the future. In changing the bid
protest rules, along with the protective order, the GAO may now award attorney fees and
other protest costs. With the incentive increasing for protestors to take their case to the
GAO, corporations will be more apt to find "hired guns" to do their bidding within the
GAO. Unless the Government is willing to fight back with its own specialists, i.e., "hired
guns," more future cases will be decided in favor of the protestor. As this happens the





The Contract Disputes Act states that the decision of an agency board of contract
appeals shall be final. However, a contractor still can appeal the decision to the US Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit within 120 days. A protestor may go directly to the
courts and bypass the boards. This is done because of the feeling by a contractor that
review by the Contracting Officer, higher authority in the procuring agency, or the
Comptroller General of the GAO is inadequate. The perceptions of inadequacy have
been discussed above. Burdens of proof, GAO rules, presumptions of correctness and the
small percentage oi' protests that are sustained by the GAO [Ref. 24:p. 1] lends credence
to perceptions of inadequacies from the protestor's point of view.
Courts tend to be more assertive in cases (1) involving possible violations of
regulatory procedures, and (2) requiring regulation interpretation. [Ref. 60:p. 660]
Courts consider themselves competent to decide what are essentially "questions of law"
or interpretation. The three forums that will be briefly discussed here are the U.S. Claims
Court, Federal District Courts, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
1. United States Claims Court
The U.S. Claims Court (Claims Court) is a national court authorized to sit
anywhere in the United States in "order to minimize inconvenience and expense to
litigants" [Ref. 23:p. 532]. Its jurisdiction is defined by subject matter not geography.
[Ref. 23:p. 532] The Claims Court has a controversial past regarding its jurisdiction. In
general, it is limited to hearing pre-award protest suits. A protest may arise even during
the solicitation phase not just the selection phase of a procurement. The Courts biggest
advantage was the ability to issue an injunction prior to contract award or the beginning
of contract performance.
The Scanwell [Ref. 31] doctrine which "favors review for those who are likely to
be injured by illegal agency action" is accepted by this Court. It opens the opportunity
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for potential contractors and interested parties to be heard in this court when they might
not have been in other forums. This is the "Court of last resort" where a protestor goes
when he hasn't followed other legal and administrative procedures. If a protestor does not
meet the filing requirements (especially in regards to time) of other forums, the Claims
Court is his means for a remedy.
This is the Court the Contracting Officer would least prefer. The Contracting
Officer's conduct will not be measured against the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) 1
[Ref. 24: p. 6] This Court limits itself to determine whether there has been a breach in
considering a bid fairly and honestly. [Ref. 24:p. 6] This means that the Court will
intervene where the Contracting Officer's actions are deemed irrational or unreasonable.
In other words, this Court has shown its willingness to replace the Contracting Officer's
decision with its own favored opinion/judgment.
A protest can be simultaneously filed in the Claims Court and an agency's Board.
The court has no jurisdiction where the same claim is pending in any other court. [Ref.
5: p. 350]
2. U.S. District Courts
This Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Claims Court. Even though the
language establishing the Claims Court gave the Claims Court "exclusive
jurisdiction" [Ref. 60] brought before an award is made, the Federal Circuit Court of
Appeals has interpreted the Act as granting concurrent jurisdiction over pre-award claims.
Therefore the District Court has both pre-award and post-award jurisdiction
[Ref. 23:p. 539] The advantage for the Contracting Officer is that the standard of review
^APA stales in part the reviewing Court shall "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with the law...".
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is found in the APA [Ref. 62: para 701]. However, the District Courts are limited by the
Contract Disputes Act of 1978 which took away its jurisdiction "over any civil action or
claim founded upon any express or implied contract ... not sounding in tort."
[Ref. 5:p. 351] This translates to: if a Contracting Officer or an Agency is in a U.S.
District Court forum for a pre-award protest, it is for the purpose of resolving a criminal
suit. The District Court retains the exclusive judicial jurisdiction for the hearing of all
post-award protest suit.
The location of a court is a matter of choice to the protestor. This choice may
give him a distinct advantage in litigation. He can choose to be heard in either 1) the
District of Columbia, or 2) in the district where the contracting action occurs, or 3) the
district where the protestor resides. [Ref. 24: p. 4]
The location advantage is offset by the protest action timing. The incurrence of
significant performance costs prior to the issuance of a TRO or preliminary injunction
may cause a Court to refuse to overturn an erroneous Contracting Officer decision on
"public policy" grounds. [Ref. 24:p. 11] An injunction or TRO cannot be issued by the
Court unless it has jurisdiction. Since in most cases the District Court does not have
jurisdiction until after the award, it can not issue the injunction or TRO. Therefore as a
matter of public policy, protests would not be sustained. The District Courts decided it
would be more costly to the Government to terminate for convenience.
3. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC)
This Court is limited in its jurisdiction. Although limited, it has jurisdiction over
all appeals from decisions of the Claims Court and agency boards of contract appeals.
[Ref. 5:p. 355] U.S. District Court's appealed decisions are heard by the U.S. Court of
Appeals, except in the case of patents. The CAFC will hear patent appeals originating in
the U.S. District Courts.
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The CAFC uses a "clearly erroneous" standard when reviewing appeals from the
Boards or subordinate Courts. [Ref. 5:p. 356] An appeal here should be to point an error
by a lower court or board not to dispute the facts of the case.
E. SUMMARY
As a procuring official in the U.S. Government, the chances of defending against a
bid protest in FIP are considerable. The choice of forum affords the Contracting Officer
advantages and concurrent disadvantages. But the choice is that of the protestor's.
Understanding the basic concepts of proof, discovery, timeliness, and standards of
judgment prior to entering a court or board will help the Contracting Officer prepare his
defense around the correct elements.
Currently the most advantageous forum for the Contracting Officer is the GAO. The
least advantageous is the U.S. Claims Court. However, the GAO is changing and
evolving with new rules of discovery, protective orders, and protest fee awards. As Mr.
Peckinpaugh pointed out "For Brooks Act procurements, the CSBCA has generally been
the protestor's forum of choice since 1985" [Ref. 2:p. 10].
The Contracting Officer can expect an increasingly hostile environment in the protest
resolution forums. A cliche that works here is: The best defense in a protest suit is a
good offense. Yet, truly the best plan is protest avoidance. Proper planning and
procedures during the solicitation and selection phase will not guarantee protection from
protests, but it can certainly minimize them.
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IV. METHOD OF RESEARCH
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous two chapters presented the environment for ADP/F1P acquisition and
the forums for protesting an ADP/FIP procurement. This chapter will describe the
methodology and concept for assembling the research data.
B. GENERAL METHODOLOGY
The research of this topic involved: 1) case analysis, 2) literature review, and 3)
selected personal interviews. Some of the research questions posed in Chapter I were
answered as a result of the literature review. It is worth noting that the preponderance of
material involved the purely "legal aspects" of Board procedures (motions, stays,
discover), rules, etc.). Although the legal aspect is important and affects the procuring
official's acquisition strategy, it was not the main thrust of this research. However, the
researcher felt that the effects of the legal aspect are germane to the topic. A brief
presentation of the material was presented in Chapter III.
The method used for the majority of this research was an analysis of the GSBCA
cases as published in the General Services Administration's, Information Resources
Management Sen ice (GSA/IRMS) ADP Protest Reports. Published quarterly, the ADP
Protest Report provides a synopsis of the cases where the Board issued a decision.
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Decisions include only those cases that were granted, denied or dismissed. The ADP





granted in part, dismissed without prejudice in part;
motion for summary relief granted.
denied includes:
denied;
denied in part, dismissed in part;




dismissal for lack of jurisdiction;
dismissal for lack of interested party;
dismissal for lack of protest basis;
dismissal for untimely filing; or
dismissal of other various GSBCA rules.
1. "Granting Rates" 1
Beginning in January 1985 to March 1991 there have been a total of 1251
protests to the Board. 2 During this time, 148 cases have been granted. A pure statistic
indicates that only 11.89J- of all protests filed with the Board have been "granted" as
defined above. However, a further statistic is of value to show the Boards "real" results.
Subtracting out the cases that have been withdrawn or settled leaves the Board with a
total of 477 protests to be formally heard. The 148 protests granted now represent a 319c
1 Source: Developed by the author from information in ADP Protest Reports
^Actual protests for this time period are 1334 Excluded from thus number are protest that were
withdrawn from the Board because they were erroneously filed with the wrong forum or dismissed by the
Board for lack of jurisdiction The excluded dismissed cases are cases that clearly did not involve ADPE
and where jurisdiction of the Board was not a "genuine" issue
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rate of protests granted. Still further, a third rate can be determined. By discounting the
cases heard but dismissed (146 protests) for lack of jurisdiction or other reasons, the
Board's "granting rate" climbs to 44.7 percent.
The cases reviewed for the data base in this research yields similar "granting
results" to that of the total population. See Figure 4.1 for a depiction of the cumulative
and sample population protest results. Appendix B contains the quarterly protest results
used for the summary in Table 4.1. The two year period is considered more reflective of














Source: ADP Protest Reports
FIGURE 4.1. PROTEST RESULTS
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Cases dismissed "for cause" are only partially included in the data base. "For
cause" includes dismissals of cases as described above. Cases that are dismissed "without
cause" fall into the category of withdrawn or settled.
In dismissed cases, the "issues oi merit," as defined below, are not addressed by
the Board; therefore, they are not germane to the analysis conducted. If issues of merit of
cases dismissed for cause were included, they would taint the results of complaints versus
decisions.
However, in dismissed cases, the "issues of jurisdiction," as defined below, are
included in a separate section of the data base. The issues of jurisdiction were not
analyzed in detail as were the issues of merit. The issues of jurisdiction are included for
informational purposes only.
3. Withdrawn or Settled
Cases that are withdrawn or settled prior to a Board ruling are not included in the
data that follow. Analysis of cases withdrawn or settled would provide a realistic look at
the problems faced by Procuring Agencies. This information proved to be difficult to
gather and beyond the capabilities of the researcher. Currently, there does not exist a
requirement for the Board to approve agency level settled protests; nor, does there exist a
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mechanism to gather data regarding cases withdrawn or settled. Despite its potential
value, the researcher does not promote a system of gathering this data as would be
mandator} if the proposed Senate Bill 3123 is enacted. The added documentary burden
may well outweigh the benefits.
4. Literature Reviews
Literature reviews included several law journals, GAO reports, and special reports by
the Board and other "watchdog" interest groups. Interviews with Navy/Marine Corps
procurement officials and attorneys supplemented the data developed.
5. Interviews
Personal and telephone interviews were conducted with Navy and Marine Corps
Procuring Officials (see Appendix C for a list of interviewees). The interviews consisted
of questions generally in line with those shown in Appendix D. Interviews were used to
establish a framework of the issues confronting procurement officials and to validate the
information developed from the case examinations. The interviews confirmed much of
the statistical data developed from the case analysis. Specific references to interviewee




The case studies involved a two year period beginning 1 April 1989 through 31
March 1991. Duplicative cases, where identified as such, constitute one case for tally
purposes. For example, where multiple protestors filed separate complaints against an
agency for the same procurement - the conglomerate comprised as one case. A total of
175 protests make up the foundation of the case base; whereas the "real cases" (non-
duplicative) totaled 155 for this period.
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Each case synopsis was examined for the issues raised by the protesting and
responding parties and extraneous issues raised by the Board. Each issue in the case was
then assigned a keyword or keywords that best described the issue(s) as succinctly as
possible. In order to avoid a built in bias for identification of issues surfaced in each case,
a rigid list of issues and keywords was avoided. The ultimate list of keywords was
dynamic and continually additive. However, to provide an element of stability, keywords
inferred a specific definition. As keywords were developed, a definition was assigned in
order to maintain continuity throughout the case study.
After the completion of keyword assignments for all cases, a keyword list was
compiled. Appendix E contains a list of the cases examined and the keyword(s) assigned
for each case(s) ] . While compiling the keyword list from the several cases, an attempt to
limit the accumulation of keywords was undertaken. To this end, unique keywords of a
few cases (the keyword assignment has an element of the researcher's subjective bias
included) were combined with comparable keywords in the tallying process. The final
list of individual keywords totaled 107. Appendix F contains an alphabetical list of
keywords for the issues of merit and selected definitions w here necessary.
2. Keywords
Keywords were then assembled into "group" headings (total of 20). The groups
accumulated a listing o^ related keywords. The groups of keywords, subsequently, fell
fairly neatly into two major divisions "issues of jurisdiction" (5 groups) and "issues of
merit" (15 groups). Issues of jurisdiction deal with the Board's authority to hear the
'Kderal Circuit Court of Appeals cases are not included in the tally. The appeals are included for
information purposes only.
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merits of the case. Issues of merit are the alleged improprieties of the acquisition. The
issues of merit also include areas of concern specifically raised by the Board, such as an
agency's solicitation that "overstated the requirements."
A tally by quarter for each keyword of each case was assigned. The calendar year
quarter was determined by the case's decision date as issued by the GSBCA. See
Appendix G for the raw data results of this tally. This appendix represents an overall
tally of the keywords of all cases examined.
The data were further refined in a similar manner for cases specifically granted by
the Board. See Appendix H for raw data results of this tally. The foundation for this
refined data base was the same as for the overall tally presented earlier. Of 56 protests
granted during this period, 40 "case records" comprise this data base. Moreover, a
keyword was credited with a tally only if it was an issue expressly granted by the Board.
In other words, if an issue was raised by the protestor, but not specifically granted by the
Board as a winning argument, it was not tallied. Several cases raised issues that were not
addressed by the Board; the finding of fault in one area, on occasion, precluded the Board
from determinations on other issues. Further, the "refined" tally of granted issues was
applied only to issues of merit . This process was not carried out for issues of jurisdiction.
D. LIMITATIONS OF APPROACH
As intent as the researcher was at maintaining a method that could be duplicated to
verify results, it would be impossible for another person to replicate the data base exactly
as formulated here. Personal feelings, judgment, estimation, opinions, and bias are
unavoidable. On occasion, a re-reading of a case synopsis yielded new keywords. The
result appeared to depend on the reader's particular perspective at the moment. This
phenomenon was discounted as a minor instability of the study. A comparison of this
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researcher's keyword assignments and random case validation with keyword assignments
by Mr. Jeff Tucker, GSA/IRMS (editor of the ADP Protest Reports) yielded comparable
results.
Another limitation of the study involves the number of data points. As discussed
more fully in the next chapter, very few data points were accumulated on the granted tally
sheet (Appendix G). This impacted the rankings by groups. A granted issue data point
on a "low volume" group could significantly change its ranking. In other words, the
system proved to be sensitive with adding one more data hit, especially in groups with
relatively few aggregated data hits.
An initial goal of the study was to conduct a quantitive analysis of the data. Again,
due to a limited number and relatively few data points, the approach was deemed
inadequate. This will be more fully explained in the next chapter.
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V. PRESENTATION OF DATA
A. INTRODUCTION
The methodology of data accumulation and assimilation was presented in the
previous chapter. The results of that effort are discussed below. This chapter presents the
data developed and gathered by the researcher regarding the GSBCA protest decisions on
the ADP/FIP acquisition and procurement process. An initial and primary effort of this
research focused on a quantitative analysis approach for future trend identification. A
secondary effort focused on a purely subjective and objective appraisal of the historical
data derived from the case analyses.
B. QUANTITATIVE/REGRESSION ANALYSIS
A quantitative/regression analysis effort was abandoned for two reasons:
1. the partial failure of previous attempts, and
2. expert advice.
1. Previous Attempts
An analysis of the GAO pre- and post-CICA experience was conducted by
Michael J. Walsh. His analytical evaluations provided inconclusive, low correlation
results [Ref. 64:pp. 85-98]. Mr. Walsh attempted the use of several analytical tools to
include linear regression, moving averages, and exponential smoothing. He rated the
models as only "fair" and "emphasized that the various forecasting methods used do not
present compelling evidence" [Ref. 65:pp. 93 & 94]. This analysis of the GSBCA,
although different in focus, experienced the same basic problems. Lou volume input
(i.e., numerical data consisting of mostly ones and zeros) and seasonal swings combine to
preclude meaningful analytic evaluation.
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2. Expert Advice
Mr. Jeff Tucker, editor of the Protest Reports, possessing both legal and
statistical experience suggested that attempts to provide quantitative trend analysis would
be inconsequential [Rcf. 65]. Also, Professor D. Barr, a mathematics instructor and
statistician at the Naval Postgraduate School, suggested that a mathematical tool for
analyzing the data in the manner the researcher sought was not attainable.
C. HISTORICAL PATTERN OF DATA
The pattern of the historical data suggests that it holds meager value for predicting
the new issues of the future. The data does, however, provide useful information
regarding the protest experience with issues of concern today. The evident patterns using
subjective analysis can be put into two general classifications: a perturbation and a
continuum.
1. Perturbations
Issues classified as perturbations had significant activity foi a definite period of
time then diminished as an important issue. A subjective analysis, see Table 5.1 and












technical leveling 1Q/FY90 & 1Q/FY91
Equivalencv
brand name or equal 1Q/FY90 & 4Q/FY90 & 1QFY91
A group/keyword was classified as a perturbation, not because the number was
necessarily high, but rather, was classified as perturbed if it appeared to have a cluster of
occurrences relatively higher than its preceding and succeeding quarters.
A perturbation suggests that the Boa'd addressed the issues adequately and defined
the "rules of engagement" sufficiently. Subsequently, Government procuring officials
and offerors adjusted their methods to comply with the Board's guidance. Conversely, if
a method for smoothing the data to adjust for "seasonal" swings could be used without
loosing valuable data points, then the results may be different. Smoothing was not used
because four (first two and last two) of the eight quarters in the study would be lost in the
process. For example, the major groups - Discussion and Termination - were raised as
issues at the beginning and end of a fiscal year. A smoothing technique may render these
perturbations "normal." Even still, a conclusion may be drawn from perturbations caused
by seasonal increases in protest observations. Agencies rushing to obligate funds prior to
the end of the fiscal year, may have been inclined to satisfy an award loser to avoid




























awardce, thereby causing the agency to go to litigation to defend its actions. However,
now the agency is defending a position that is nearly untenable. It must now defend a
position that it erred in the first award and the second awardee should have been the
original rightful awardee.
Likewise - Discussions, a major group - if smoothed, may not have stood out as an
issue for classification as a perturbation. Discussions perturbated in this study in an
apparent seasonal pattern during the first quarter of the fiscal year. This suggest the
opposite phenomenon occurring than in agency terminations. Agencies are not
necessarily "rushed" at the beginning of a new fiscal year, and therefore most likely take
more time to conduct lengthy discussions. These in turn are perceived, rightfully or
wrongfully as auctioning or technical leveling.
Additionally, the method of case/issue and keyword assignment used by the
researcher is susceptible to an aggregation distortion. For example, the issues of
auctioning and technical leveling are very closely related. In auctioning, a technical
leveling process may be taking place, advertently or inadvertently. The scoring process
of this research, in one case, assigned a tally to both keywords. In several cases, a single
issue could be assigned more than one keyword. This was avoided to the extent possible,
but the researcher sometimes felt it necessary to "double tally" an issue for data purposes.
Seasonal fluctuations are apparent when examining the number of issues raised per
quarter. See Figure 5.2. The first quarter of the two fiscal years in the sample period
indicates a dramatic rise in the numbers of issues raised. The end of a fiscal year and the
beginning of a fiscal year also had noticeable increases in the numbers of protest filed for
this same period. Despite the apparent seasonal problems in determining true
perturbations, the data provides insight into the issues that emerge as a result of the fiscal
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FIGURE 5.2. SEASONAL FLUCTUATIONS
2. Continuum
A subjective analysis indicates the issues of protest surfacing regularly. This list,
see Table 5.2, consists of either:
1. an individual keyword where enough data points are regularly accumulated across
the sample period to be of significance; or
2. a major group where the aggregate tally of keywords across the same period is
significant while the individual kevword tallv is not.
As in perturbations, it was not the quantity of data hits that accounted for a
group/keyword to be classified as a continuum; rather, it was the steady accumulation of










Personnel (as a group)
Solicitation (as a group)
Specification (as a group)
The groups and keywords identified in Table 5.2 are issues that the Board and
Contracting Officers deal with routinely. Specifications, Solicitations, and Evaluations
will be more thoroughly discussed in Chapter VI, Case Analysis. The group - Personnel -
took regular data hits throughout the sample period, but at a very low rate. The median
data hits for Personnel was one for the eight quarters. The issues varied between
resumes; conflicts of interest, and other Personnel issues. Discussions and Personnel
issues will not be analyzed in detail in this study.
D. OBJECTIVE PRESENTATION OF THE TALLY RESULTS
1. Overall Analysis
The tally should be reflective of field procuring officials' perceptions of the
prevailing protest issues. Indeed, it was unanimous of all interviewees that the evaluation
process was one of the most common reasons for protest complaints. Therefore, it is no
surprise that the data also indicate that the evaluation process rated highest in reasons for
protest. The evaluation process accounted for nearly 37% of all the issues raised during
this two year period. The tally results for issues of merit resulted in a percentage ranking
of the groups as shown in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.3. Within the top five groups, the
keywords/issues that accounted for the most protests are presented in Table 5.4.
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TABLE: 5.3
GROUP RANKING - OVERALL AND GRANTED
Group Overall Granted















The group percentages in Table 5.3 were calculated as a proportion of the sum of
data hits for the sample period. There were 332 total data hits in the overall tally. Three
groups - Evaluations, Specifications, and Solicitations - accounted for 51.2% of the data
hits with 121,35, and 34 (total -190) tallies respectively.
The keyword percentages of Table 5.4 were calculated as a proportion of their
respective groups. Generally, the keywords that account for 2/3 or more of that group's
issues are shown.
1 36.6% 1 31.9
2 10.3% 3 15.3
3 10.3% 2 18.6
4 9.4% 5 5.6
5 4.5% 8 2.8
6 4.2% 4 8.2
7 3.9% 7 4.2
X 3.9% 9 2.8
9 3.6% 10 2.8
10 3.3% 6 5.6
11 2.7% 12 1.4
12 2.4% 11 2.8
13 1.8% 13 2.8





















FIGURE 5.3. ISSUES OF MERIT RANKINGS
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TABLE: 5.4
TOP FIVE PROTESTS ISSUES BY
GROUP AND KEYWORD






























As discussed in Chapter IV, a tally of keywords for cases granted by the Board
was accomplished. Fifty-six cases were granted, using the definition of Chapter IV,
during the sample period. The data represent 40 cases; 16 cases were not included to
avoid duplicative scoring. Tabic 5.3 ranks the groups using percentages of issues granted
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by the Board as a proportion of the sum of all issues granted. Again, Evaluation ranked
number one with 23 granted data hits. Specifications and Solicitation exchanged seats for
the second and third chair with 1 1 and 13 granted issues respectively. Between these
three groups, 65.8% of all issues granted reside. That is 47 of the 72 issues granted by the
Board.
A comparison of the rankings between overall and granted, indicate very little
displacement of the groups. The two groups with the largest displacement, actually are
not considered notable.
Best Value (5 to 8) and Procedure (10 to 6), as are all groups below three, are
extremely sensitive to the number of issues granted for their ranking. The data hits (25)
exclusive of the top three are distributed amongst the other 11 groups. One granted data
hit means 1.4%. The percentage rankings are essentially meaningless for the group ranks.
It is better to refer to the most and the least granted groups. The objective analysis using
percentages for ranking the granted issues is a system that is only fair at best.
Continuing to use the same lexicographic analysis as above (i.e., determine the
highest granting rate by group, then by individual keyword within the group), resulted in
the presentation of Table 5.5. Due to the weakness of a percentage ranking discussed
above, percentages are not provided. Although, percentages were used to derive the
presentation of Table 5.5.
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TABLE 5.5


















The information above is interesting alone. Much analysis could be accomplished.
Some generalized observations have been made with the data, but within the limitations
as pointed out above. However, this researcher devised a mathematical scheme to
compare the sample periods overall data of Appendix G with the granted data of
Appendix H. The application of the formula returns an index number for each group and
keyword. The resultant index is an indicator of how each keyword compares with other
keywords in terms of success and failure (dependent on point of view) as issues before
the Board.
1. The Formula
A data point was considered an equal part of the whole. Each data point was
weighted as 1/332 and 1/72 for the overall and granted tallies respectively. Data points
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were summed across the quarters for each keyword for both the overall and granted
tallies. The sums were then multiplied by the weights determined by the aggregate of all
data points for their respective lists. The value obtained for a keyword on the overall tally-
was subtracted from the value obtained for the same keyword on the granted tally sheet





FIGURE 5.4 WEIGHTED INDICES FORMULA
k^ r = keyword tally point in quarter q, granted.
k^ = keyword tally point in quarter q, overall.
q = quarters 1 through 8 of the sample period.
a= total data points on granted tally sheet.
P = total data points on overall tally sheet
2. Interpreting the Results
The weighted index has no positive or negative bounds. In other words, there are
no positive or negative limits to the values of the index; the index values may go to +/-
infinity. However, it is very unlikely that the values will be very large at all. Indeed, the
values for this sample period range from a -4.5 low to a +7.5 high. More sample data
would likely have increased the range of values. (But again, the sample period was
limited to the recent two years in order to obtain the most current "picture.") The more
positive the value, the more likely that issue will be favored by the Board. The more
negative the value, the less likely that issue will be favored.
3. Validity of Index - Examples
The index values are not percentages. A percentage of times granted over total
times heard would yield the same results. For example, a keyword tally of 1/1 and 19/19
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yield 100 percent. A keyword tally of 0/1 and 0/19 also yield equivalent results:
percent. The weighted index avoids this problem.
The index, due to its unbounded nature, provides a much higher positive value in
the 19/19 case than the 1/1 case. Conversely, the 0/19 case provides a more negative
value than the 0/1 case. See Table 5.6 for selected case values. Relatively speaking, a
higher level of confidence can be attributed to the indexes worth the more positive or
more negative the value. An (leap of faith) assumption here is that the more often an
issue is raised before the Board, the more in depth the nuances of the issue are explored.




GRANTED TOTAL PERCENT INDEX
1 1 100 +1.1
19 19 100 +20.7
5 10 50 +3.9




The raw-score, index calculation results are presented in Appendix I. This
Appendix displays the sample period - overall and granted - tally totals, and the index
scores. The relative index weights of each group are presented in Figure 5.5. Solicitation
and Specification has a solid command of the first two positions with index scores of 7.5
and 5.0 respectively. Evaluation moved from always first by percentages to last by
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This chapter presented the case study results in four formats:
1. Subjective analysis of
a. perturbalcd issues and
b. continuous issues,
2. Objective overall percentage rank from sample period data,
3. Objective granted percentage rank from sample period data, and
4. Indexed rank from sample period data.
The data were supported by graphs, tables and charts . Evaluation, Specification, and
Solicitation, as major groups, were cited as continuing issues (i.e., continuum) and they
also rated highest of all the groups by objective percentage ranking for overall issues and
granted issues. However, by the weighted index ranking, Solicitation and Specifications
rated as issues most favored by the Board. Evaluation fell to the least favored issue by
the Board.
The next chapter will explore the reasons for the weighted index rankings. Case
decisions and opinions of the Board will be discussed for the top two groups (Solicitation




"The trend [in ADP] is to protest," CDR Ken Dewell noted [Ref. 66]. Michile
Templcman made a statement to the effect, that "if you think it uses ADP, if it might use
ADP, or if their is a probability that ADP will be used, than it probably is ADP" [Ref.
67]. With these two general comments from two very knowledgeable and respected
professionals in ADP/FIP acquisition, one can comprehend the value of knowing the
reasons for protests. Know ledge of the protest issues and the GSBCA tendencies may
help a Contracting Officer to avoid a protest, which is an intelligent goal in ADP/FIP
contracting. If a protest cannot be avoided, knowledge of GSBCA decisions and
interpretations regarding the issues may help the Contracting Officer weight a decision in
favor of avoiding or pursuing litigation.
The data presented in the previous chapter noted the leading issues in a protest by
percentage of total of protest issues. Also noted is the leading issues sustained in support
of the protestor by percentage of granted issues. Finally, a formula to weight the issues
and comparatively rank them was presented. The weighted indices was used to determine
the issues to explore in more depth. A discussion of the issues identified by means of the
weighted indices follows.
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B. ANALYSIS VIA THE WEIGHTED INDICES
1. Problems Start at the Beginning
"Most failures begin with not defining your needs properly" [Ref. 6]. Indeed, the
two group issues that remained with highest ranking throughout the different analyses
were Specification and Solicitation. These two groups ranked consistently in the top
three.
In the weighted index, Solicitations ranked highest with an index score of +7.5.
Specifications ranked second with an index score of +5.0. Evaluations fell to last with an
index score of -4.5.
It is worth noting, that many times throughout this study, the analysis was made
difficult by the inability to differentiate between a strictly Specification issue or a
Solicitation issue. The issue was sometime blurred as to the correct categorization.
Because of this "blurring," it could be argued that the Solicitation and Specification
groups should be combined into one. The researcher will not combine Solicitation and
Specification for objective analysis purposes in this research. However, if they were
combined, it would have a dramatic effect on the quantitative results. The combination of
the two groups would consistently outreach any other issue of contention.
For the quantitative/objective analysis, the keywords have not been combined.
However, in the case analyses of the issues at hand in this chapter, Specification and
Solicitation will be combined. The keywords/issues that "win" at the GSBCA have
similar implications from both the Specification and Solicitation groups. The leading













2. The Competition Angle
The Board established a penchant for competition early. In its first ten months of
existence, the Board "enforced competition' 59 percent of the time" [Ref. 32:p. 159]. The
weighted indices analysis bears out the fact that this is just as true now as it was earlier.
From the researchers perspective, all five keywords listed above are dealt with by the
Board from a "restrictive competition" interpretation. Additionally, many of the other
groups and keywords could be linked to the Board's propensity to interpret the issues with
some hint of avoiding "restrictive competition."
As will be presented, — Specification, Solicitation, and Evaluation — are
evaluated by the Board with a view towards competition. The researcher will examine
the Board's direction in regards to Specification and Solicitation as a whole, then turn to
an examination of the evaluation issues and other pertinent issues that surfaced during the
case analvses.
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C. RESTRICTING COMPETITION VIA SPECIFICATIONS AND
SOLICITATION
There are limitations on competition inherent in all procurements. . . . There is
only one issue: are the agency's needs such that it acted properly - reasonably,
legitimately, permissibly - in narrowing competition 1 [Ref. 38:p. 270].
The Board has held that it will not take issue with an agency's narrowing of
competition in pursuit of legitimate agency requirements, but it can and will overturn
those requirements that improperly limit competition 2 [Ref. 33:p. 39]. All specifications
to one extent or another limit competition. The determining factor for the GSBCA
regarding restrictive competition is whether the agency's specification/solicitation states
requirements beyond its needs.
In this researcher's opinion, this is where the Board's judgment of agency needs takes
on an air o( controversy. The Board has noted that it will "grant deference to an agency's
technical judgment, but . . . will not slavish' follow it." [Ref. 33:p. 39]. However, in
practice and as demonstrated by the statistics, the protestor's best chance for "winning" is
alleging restrictive competition. Again, restricting competition may come in many forms;
however, the issues at hand appear to be the easiest, attainable target. Some Board
decisions may be indicative of their persuasion.
1. Performance Requirements
In 1985, the GSBCA held that a performance requirement not being met was not
sufficient grounds for disqualifying an offeror from competition. The performance
requirement, as judged by the Board, was a Specification, not an Evaluation criteria. Had
the performance requirement been a part of the Evaluation criteria, the Government,
according to the Board, may have prevailed. Additionally, the Board said the agency
•Case cited GSBCA 7929-P
2Case cited GSBCA 7927-P
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could not justify its needs. Therefore, the agency overstated its minimum requirements 1 .
[Ref. 33]. This is a prime example of the Board's very liberal interpretation of a
specification limiting competition.
2. New Versus Used Equipment
In 1986, a protest was upheld on the grounds of unduly restrictive specifications
because the agency required new equipment. A major reason for granting the protest was
that the Board found the agency's reasons for requiring new equipment non-supportable.
The Board, in this decision, overrode the preference for new material set forth in FAR
10.010(a)2 [Ref. 69:p. 17]. This marks again the Board's willingness to replace its
judgment for the Contracting Officer's and its willingness to determine the "needs" of the
agency. In this case, the Board granted the protest to "enforce competition."
Additionally, the Board required that any restriction placed on the offering of used
equipment must be justified and approved3 [Ref. 2:p. 22].
A GSA solicited non-mandatory schedules contract excluded used equipment
from being offered. The Board granted the protest stating that competition should be
open to all sources. Further, used equipment has the potential for providing the lowest
overall cost alternative to the Government [Ref. 70]. It is hard to disagree with the
reasoning of the Board regarding full and open competition. But in the opinion of this
researcher, lowest overall cost gained by "competition" ignores most advantageous and
life-cycle cost principles.
3. Justification and Approval
The Board, in a protest that it denied, openly stated its recognition that "every
solicitation involves some restrictions . . . and is permitted under conditions which are
'Case cited GSBCA 7927-P
2Case cited GSBCA 8131-P
3Case cited GSBCA 8131-P
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necessary to satisfy [the] needs of any agency" [Ref. 71]. As evident from several cases,
the agency should be well prepared to defend its position regarding needs and
justification for limiting competition. In fact, the Board noted that restrictive
specifications are acceptable if sufficiently justified by the agency 1 [Ref. 39:p. 51].
Further, this applies to software also (i.e., agency sufficiently justified the need for
LOTUS 123 and DBase) 2 [Ref. 39: p. 51].
4. Economy and Efficiency
Convenience, economy, and efficiency are not valid reasons for limiting
competition. In an "all or nothing" solicitation, the Government excluded an offer
because it proposed using subcontractors. The Board opined that "economy and
efficiency is best served by full & open competition." [Ref. 72].
5. Ambiguity
In this researcher's weighted indices analysis, ambiguity in both the Solicitation
and Specifications rated low (-1.8 and -0.7). In the overall raw tally, ambiguity for
Solicitation and Specification rated high. This seems to run counter to intuition. Upon
further examination, this is consistent with the Board's ardor for competition.
A functional specification, that is ambiguous for the purpose of maximizing
competition, is allowed. Where the ambiguity occurs, "the agency will be simply held to
the least restrictive interpretation" [Ref. 73;Ref. 39:p 51].
If a protestor wants to challenge a Specification's or Solicitation's ambiguity, he
must do it prior to the time required for submission of proposals3 [Ref. 39:p. 58]. Many
of the ambiguity challenges are dismissed due to the timeliness issue (as discussed in
Chapter III). If the protestor challenges the ambiguity after the proposal submission time,
'Case cited GSBCA 91931-P
2Case cited GSBCA 8638-P
3C;ise cited GSBCA 9874-P
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he cannot challenge the "ambiguity," but must challenge the reasonableness of the
agency's interpretation 1 [Ref. 39:p. 58]. And if so challenged, "the agency must give the
solicitation a less, rather than more, restrictive reading" [Ref. 39:p. 58;Ref. 34].
Additionally, many restrictive Specification protests are settled prior to filing a
complaint or before a formal hearing with the Board. Mr. Tucker's informal study of
withdrawn and settled protests, noted that many implicated a restrictive specification. He
believes that it is in the agency's best interest to settle restrictive competition complaints,
especially Specification and Solicitation issues, prior to formal litigations.
6. Amendment of Solicitation
"It is not improper to amend a solicitation to keep offerors in the competition so
long as the amendment reflects legitimate Government requirements" [Ref. 74]. If
amended, the agency must allow sufficient time for an offeror to respond [Ref. 75].
Further in the opinion of the researcher, the Board implied that amending a solicitation in
response to a protest just to avoid litigation is unreasonable. The modifications in this
case were "minor and did not reflect any changed requirements" [Ref. 76]. The Board
granted the protestor's claim that the amendment was unnecessary. In the author's words,
if a solicitation is amended, minor changes to satisfy a protestor is not sufficient. The
solicitation must be altered as to reflect "true" changes of the agency's needs and
minimum requirements.
7. Commerce Business Daily (CBD) Synopsis
CBD synopsis issues went three for three with an index score of +3.3, and
therefore requires mention in this section. Again, the issues can be expressed in terms of
competition. All the requirements and evaluation factors must be stated in the CBD
'Case cited GSBCA 9874-P
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synopsis [Rcf. 77]. The Government must indicate its minimum requirements in the
synopsis so "all prospective offerors can compete on an equal footing" [Ref. 78].
In another case, the agency did not synopsize its solicitation in the CBD as
required by the GSA Handbook. In granting this protest, the geographic location
requirement for teleprocessing services was considered competition restrictive. The
solicitation required that the equipment be located in Washington DC, the protestor was
in Johnstown, PA. The Board decreed "the end of a telephone line in Johnstown, PA,
looks and performs much like the end of a line in Washington, DC." [Ref. 79]. The
issues tallied under "CBD synopsis" did not necessarily deal with the CBD, inasmuch as
the issues centered on the need to promote competition.
8. Section Summary - Solicitation/Specification
Competition is narrowed by the mere act of writing a specification. What is a
reasonable limitation of competition has been addressed by the GSBCA in numerous
protests. The Board has shown favor to protests complaints of unnecessarily restrictive
Specifications. The Government, in order to prevail, must justify its minimum needs, and
solicit only to meet its minimum needs. The Government's solicitation for its minimum
needs cannot limit competition by excluding offeror's solutions that are not convenient for
the Government or appear to be counter to economy and efficiency. Further, the GSBCA
imposes upon the Government a duty to include the maximum number of offerors by
interpreting both the Solicitation and Specification in the least restrictive manner,
specifications that appear to be ambiguous are acceptable if the result enhances
competition.
D. EVALUATION
Evaluation, as a group dropped to last in the weighted index analysis (score = -4.5).
This was the most unexpected result of the weighted index analysis. In terms of raw tally
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scores, Evaluation was the highest in overall complaints (121) and highest in complaints
granted (23). Just the sheer numbers of complaints accounts for the apparent poor
showing in the granting tally. However, by this researcher's analysis, it appears that the
Government is doing better in Evaluation and selection process than the common
perception would indicate.
The common perception, and rightfully so to a point, holds that the evaluation
process is the cause of most protests 1 . And, it is. However, by comparing the number of
complaints versus those granted using the weighted index, it is evident that the
Government is relatively successful in defending its position. The following comments
may provide some insight to the Government's success.
In a decision regarding alleged agency bias, the Board stated the "presumption that
Government Officials acting in the official capacity do so in good faith" [Ref. 80]
Mr. Carl Peckinpaugh characterized the Board's persuasion very succinctly and
clearly with:
Generally, in both the GSBCA and GAO, considerable discretion will be accorded
to a source selection authority's reasonable exercise of discretion in selecting the
successful offeror, and minor violations which are not prejudicial to the outcome will
be tolerated. [Ref 2: p. 24]
Evaluation complaints centered on:
improper application of criteria (19/7, index = +4.0)
responsiveness (25/5, index = -0.6)
non-responsiveness (19/1, index = -4.3)
technical evaluation (20/3, index = -1.8)
and
competitive range (9/1, index = -1.3)
Additionally, use of a cost surcharge (2/2, index = +2.2), cost of doing business penalties,
had a heavv influence on the Evaluation index score.
' Source: Telephone interviews conducted by researcher.
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1. Improper Application
The Board carries its penchant for competition into the source evaluation and
selection process. Chief Judge and Chairman of the GSBCA Leonard J. Suchanek writes
that "evaluation factors must not necessarily restrict competition" [Ref. 39:p. 52].
Disclosure of the pertinent factors and subfactors in Evaluation and selection are required
by the FAR and FIRMR. These must be disclosed "in a manner that is not confusing"
[Ref. 39:p. 53]. In this researcher's opinion, the Board is very strict in its application of
the Evaluation factors as set forth in the solicitation. The decisions, in the large part,
revolve around either "you did or did not" apply the criteria as stated.
The "gray" areas that creep into the process invariably involve interpretations and
definitions. Terms such as current production [Ref. 81;Ref. 39:p. 54], formally
announced [Ref. 82;Ref. 39:p. 54], and commercially available [Ref. 82] are terms that
have caused problems recently. Mr. Peckinpaugh notes that:
The use of technical jargon as a short hand expression for what is desired is a very
common mistake. Even. . . a requirement for commercial off-the-shelf products may
be unacceptablv vague. . . the parties all seem to interpret the provisions differentlv.
[Ref 2: p. 25]
2. Responsiveness and Non-responsiveness
As used in this research, responsiveness and non-responsiveness are essentially
the same. The not so subtle difference, however, is - who is complaining about what? In
"responsiveness," the complaint is brought by a protestor claiming the awardee was not
responsive. In "non-responsiveness," the protestor is denying the agency's evaluation of
his own responsiveness.
In relation to each other, it is more difficult to have a protest sustained about an
awardee's responsiveness. In the overall evaluation, Government agencies have generally
made valid determinations regarding offeror's responsiveness.
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The Board has taken a position that supports the data. "If an offer is deficient in
an inconsequential manner that can be readily verified, so as to constitute a minor
informality, its rejection is inappropriate 1 " [Ref. 39:p 54]. In other words, a minor faux
pas in the offer where the outcome is not effected will be tolerated. The Contracting
Officer does not have to look for every little mistake in order to make a responsiveness
determination. "Minor informalities [are] properly waived by Contracting Officer[s]" 2
[Ref. 39:p. 55]. In what should become a classic statement suitable for framing, the
Board said, "Any good lawyer can pick lint off any Government procurement, . . . We
will not set aside an award, even if violations of law are found, unless those violations
have some significance" [Ref. 84], An example of a minor informality that a Contracting
Officer should be allowed to correct is a certification not completed by the offeror3
[Ref. 39: p. 54].
3. Technical Evaluation
This is not only a very difficult area for most Contracting Officers to understand,
but it is also difficult to describe the synergistic effect the Board has had on technical
evaluations. Several comments were received from interviewees that the Board does not
always understand some of the complex technical issues. In the opinion of the researcher,
the technical expertise assumed by the Board is based upon their position of final
authority. However, the Board is required to make technical judgments when
interpreting laws, statutes, and regulations.
Suffice it to say here that the Board's approach in technical evaluation is similar
to its overall philosophy noted above - enhance competition and strict adherence to the
!Case cited GSBCA 9508-P
2Case cited GSBCA 9548-P
^Federal Court Circuit No 88-1 106
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specifications. Therefore, avoidance of the appearance of bias by the agency in the
evaluation process and substantiated cost/technical tradeoff are demanded.
4. Documentation
The word substantiated cannot be emphasized enough. Most interviewees, stated
that GSBCA decisions have caused them to more fully document their selection process.
Subjective as well as objective reasoning is documented and substantiated completely.
The documentation is accomplished with the forethought of protest litigation and defense.
One interviewee said, "everyone involved in the selection process is a potential [protest]
witness." As such, each is expected to thoroughly brief the chain-of-command and
document the selection process.
A law review article stated,
The attorney should persuade both the Contracting Officer and technical
personnel to do a thorough job of documenting the contract files, . . . because once a
protest is filed, little time is available to prepare a well -reasoned justification. [Ref.
68: p. 269]
5. Cost Surcharge
Although the issue of cost surcharge appeared only twice during the sample
period, it lent a high positive value to the index. The researcher feels that this is
important to note because of the emergence of evaluation programs such as
Red/Yellow/Green (RYG) in the Navy and Marine Corps. The RYG program, in a
nutshell, tacks on a penalty, estimated to be the cost of doing business, to a proposal. A
contractor is classified as either red, yellow , or green on various factors having to do with
past performance and quality. Although, the researcher feels that this program has some
merit, he also feels that the GSBCA will find fault if it is applied to ADP/FIP
acquisitions.
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The protestor maintained the surcharge was unreasonable. The Board granted the
protest because it found fault with the study that estimated the cost of doing business
[Ref. 85]. Taking this approach, the researcher feels that an estimate can always be found
to have fault, or "lint."
6. Other Issues
a. Creative Offers
Some issues were not readily discernible from the study data. For example,
the Board has ruled on creative offers. A creative price strategy is not a violation to be
litigated. There is no "express prohibition" against it. The reason - competition. A
competitive system encourages such flexibility 1 . [Ref. 39:p. 55] However, the Board
laid down its guidelines for Contracting Officers to follow when evaluating a "creative"
offer. The Contracting Officer must:
- determine conformity to solicitation,
- determine if the offer meets agency requirements, and
- determine if all offerors had the same chance to be creative 2 . [Ref. 39:p. 55]
Contracting Officers, now must pass judgment on the ability and opportunity of an
offeror to be creative.
b. Judgment ofContracting Officer
There is an element of judgment rendered by the Board in every decision.
Obviously, judgment was used in making the original award determination by the
Contracting Officer and all the other members of the source selection team. As stated
previously, the Board cannot impose its own views of agency needs [Ref. 7:para 759(e)].
•Case cited GSBCA 8879-P
2Case cited GSBCA 9170-P
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The Board's usual solution to resolving its "judgment" with the agency's needs, are to
order the agency to re-examine its solicitation and the statement of their needs. Tally
results are not available. This is a difficult issue to assign a numerical score.
In protests where the judgment of the Contracting Officer has been directly
questioned, there are comments, decisions, and precedence. The Board's support of
Contracting Officer's judgment in previous cases is noted when "discretion is exercised
wisely" [Ref. 86]. The Board stated, ". . . we will not disturb . . . discretionary
determinations absent a showing that the determinations lacked a rational basis . . ." [Ref.
87;Ref. 86]. The Contracting Officer's decision must be, in the Board's opinion, a
"reasonable exercise of business judgment, consistent with the terms of the solicitation."
Even decision of the Board on the issues of merit involves a judgment by the Board
regarding the decision and judgment of the Contracting Officer. A truly in-depth analysis
is not possible based upon case readings alone. Suffice it to say that the Board's own
judgment was questioned by several interviewees. However, the record shows, that
where judgment of the Contracting Officer was or became a specifically stated issue of
the protest, the Board has favored upholding the Contracting Officer's decision.
Judgment of the Board is more labyrinthine. A recent decision on appeal to
the Federal Circuit Court chastised the Board for replacing its judgment of agency needs
with that of the agency's. The Federal Circuit Court reversed a decision because, amongst
other reasons, the Board was ". . .driven by its own assessment of the agency's "true" data
processing needs . . ." The Federal Circuit Court continued with
. . .the board has no warrant to question the agency's judgment or to revise its
delegation o( procurement authority to ensure that the agency's assessment of its 'true'
needs is in harmony with the board's. 1 [Ref. 88]
•Federal Court Circuit No. 90-1264 (9 October 1990) appeal of GSBCA 10468-P
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The original protest of the appealed Board decision did not call into specific
question the judgment of the Contracting Officer. In fact, the protest dealt with licensing
requirements, unbalanced pricing, ambiguous solicitation and non-responsiveness. In the
researcher's opinion, the Federal Circuit Court's decision could significantly weaken the
Board. Routine decisions by the Board are open for questions as to the "assessment of
agency need" and the direction provided the Government by the Board. Indeed the
Board's granting rates fell significantly after the Federal Circuit Court decision. It is
difficult to draw a direct correlation; however, for six months after this decision (an
coincidentally the last two quarters of the sample period), the Board only granted eight
protests. Appendix B provides the detailed data. A comparison of the granting rates is
provided in Table 6.2 using the same approach as in Chapter IV.
TABLE 6.2










The ADP Protest Report commentary, V3/N4, provides several other
insightfull possible explanations of this dramatic shift in the granting rate. It is this
researcher's opinion that the Federal Circuit Court reversal had a large impact on the
Board and its decision making. Government agency's, at least in the near term can expect
less "judgmental" decisions from the Board.
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7. Section Summary - Evaluation
Evaluation issues, a post-award protest issue, ranks the highest in numbers of
complaints and issues granted. The overall high numbers might tend to indicate to the
impercipient observer the Government's weakness. However, in the researcher's opinion,
this is the "issue of convenience" for the sore losers described in Chapter I. This may
account for the low index number (for evaluations many post-award protests do not have
sufficient grounds to be sustained).
The Board's position on Evaluation issues may be summarized as follows: In
evaluating the solicitation, strict adherence to the stated evaluation criteria is demanded.
However, when making responsiveness determinations, a less then strict adherence is
acceptable; thus, allowing offerors to stay in competition when they might otherwise have
been eliminated. The Contracting Officers must provide equal opportunity for all to
compete. Finally, the evaluation and selection process must be fully and accurately
justified and documented.
E. GAO FINDINGS
A GAO study released in March 1990 studied ADP/FIP settlements. In the study,
GAO looked at 123 protests, 17 of which were granted by the GSBCA. The study period
began 1 April 1988 and ended 30 September 1988. The report summarized the findings
of the granted protests. See Appendix J for a reproduction of the GAO specific
violations.
The specific violations in these 17 protests primarily involved agencies limiting
the protestors' opportunities to compete. For example, in three protests the GSBCA
found that the agency evaluated proposals on factors not specified in the solicitation.
In other cases, the GSBCA found that the agency did not properly document the need
for specific make and model specifications in the solicitation and did not describe the
Government's requirements clearly, accurately, and completely in the invitation for
bids. [Ref. 30: p. 21]
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The researcher's study found many of the same recurring violation themes. Listed below
are some of the 1988 violations and recurrent violations of the immediate study.
1
.
Improper rejection of protestor's bid as nonresponsive.
2. Amended solicitation did not provide adequate response time.
3. Improper evaluation; application of criteria/factors not specified in solicitation.
4. Failure to document the need for specific make and model.
5. Failure to include a specific list of salient characteristics for brand name or equal
features (equivalency in researcher's study data).
6. Improper agency termination of awarded contract.
7. Failure to obtain a DPA considered under junsdiction, Brooks Act and Wamer
Amendment in researcher's study data).
8. Improper/inadequate discussions.
9. Improper system-life (life-cycle) cost analysis, i.e., no valid basis for lowest overall
cost decision.
10. Best and Final Offers (BAFO) not considered in their entirety.
Other specific violations noted in the GAO report were overturned by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit Court. Therefore, they do not appear in the above list.
F. USE OF THE WEIGHTED INDICES
The index provided a method for ranking the issues favored and not favored by the
GSBCA. This can be used as a gauge for issues to avoid in a formal protest (i.e., avoid
GSBCA litigation if possible) by the Contracting Officer. Unfortunately, it is not a
foolproof gauge. It is a system to be used in assisting a Contracting Officer's decision to
settle or pursue a formal protest proceeding. The issues are varied and often have slightly
different twists. A more thorough research of the issues are necessary to obtain a full
understanding of the keywords. Legal assistance is advisable. Short of always seeking
legal advice, the index can provide a useful insight for the Contracting Officer regarding
the issues and how Government agencies have fared in the past.
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY
Restricting competition in most any form results in a sustained GSBCA protest in
favor of the protestor. The proper writing of the Solicitation and Specifications are the
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most important factors necessary in avoiding a protest that will be sustained by the
GSBCA. Although their numbers are higher, Evaluation issues (post-award protests) are
not the "black cloud" of procurements as the weighted index indicates. Protests cannot be
completely avoided from protestors seeking to use the legal route to compensate for their
loss and to recoup bid and proposal costs. Claiming an Evaluation impropriety is the
most popular post-award complaint. All things considered, it is the researcher's opinion
that the GSBCA is fairly consistent in its selective application of the law and statutes. In
particular, the Board has consistently demanded that competition not be restricted. The
demand for application of the Board's concept of competition is held above other possibly
conflicting concepts, such as economy and efficiency. Additionally, the prevalent issues
found in this study were generally the same as those found in an earlier, similar study
conducted bv the GAO.
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. RESTATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES
The area of research for this thesis was the ADPE or FIP acquisition bid protest
process. The goal was to determine the role of the GSBCA in ADP/FIP bid protests, the
reasons for ADP/FIP bid protests, the trends in protests, and suggested
methods/procedures to consider in avoiding protests.
Briefings by various military acquisition officials lead the researcher to an
unsupported conclusion that contractors are making a business decision to protest a very
large number of Government ADPE acquisition contract awards. For purely business
reasons (i.e. hurt the competition, you can't lose - even if all you succeed in doing is
delaying the original award), contractors feel it is worth the time and effort to protest a
Government ADPE acquisition decision. The protest decision may or may not be based
on merit. The Government must then defend its decision in a forum of the contractor's
choosing. The research was focused on the forums of protest and their effects with
particular attention on one forum, the GSBCA.
The role of the GSBCA was examined by case analysis. Then a numerical scoring
system was applied. The role of the GSBCA was clearly defined in the case analysis.
The trends were not so clearly defined. However, a personality regarding the Board
could be identified.
The GSBCA, given concurrent authority over ADPE procurements by an Act of
Congress in 1984 through the Competition in Contracting Act, takes its role to uphold
competition seriously. This research necessarily involves actions by protestors against
Government agencies. Therefore the view most apparent is Government agencies versus
"them" (offerors) and the GSBCA. The cases given the closest scrutiny here are the
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protests the Government agencies "lost." A cursory examination of the cases "won" by
Government agencies, indicate a consistency of the Board. So, in the following
comments, where the Government lost and where they won, the same Board principles
applied consistently.
B. MAJOR CONCLUSIONS
1. Most ADP/FIP Procurements are not Protested
Relatively few ADP/FIP procurements are formally protested. However, the
439c (using the high number) that are, have significant affect on all ADP/FIP
procurements. These protests are the definition setting, law and regulation interpreting
cases.
2. Statute, Laws, and Regulations are Unnecessarily Complex
The FIRMR, created in response to congressional statute, is a separate regulation
for purchasing essentially a single type commodity. The existence of the Brooks Act and
mary other laws, i.e., the FIRMR, and all the other supplemental regulations for this
commodity, have complicated the purchasing process for ADP/FIP.
This commodity is pervasive in the personal and professional lives of Americans
and its use is continually expanding. With the expansion of the use of computing, as such
the use of ADP/FIP, the GSBCA has expanded its jurisdictional frontier. The GSBCA's
jurisdictional expansion coincides with the narrowing of the scope of the Warner
Amendment exemptions for the Department of Defense.
3. GSBCA has a Disposition for Competition
The Board's jurisdiction is rooted in the Brooks Act. The Brooks Act further
established the ADP/FIP procurement system we live with today. However, the Board's
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major emphasis in granting protests is the protection of competition as required by CICA.
The GSBCA is resolved to support the concept of competition even at the expense of
economy and efficiency as required by the Brooks Act.
4. Government Agencies Lack the Ability to Define ADP/FIP Requirements
As indicated by the weighted indices, the Solicitation and Specifications
contained therein do not adequately define the agencies requirements. As required by the
FAR, only the minimum requirements of the agency will be solicited. The evidence
suggests that Contracting Officer's are not able to define the "requirement" adequately to
the satisfaction of the GSBCA. The complex requirements of the agency are not
understood by the Contracting Officer nor adequately conveyed by technical personnel.
This lack of understanding translates to modifications and misinterpretations of the
Solicitation. Also, due to the lack of understanding, the Evaluation criteria are poorly
written or misapplied.
5. Protest Issues Have not Changed
Comparing the results of this study and the results of a similar 1988 study by the
GAO indicate that many of the same issues are constantly recurring. Indeed, this study
found many issues that occurred on a continuum throughout this two year sample period.
These coincided with the same issues that the GAO study found. Exclusion from
competitive range, improper evaluation, poor solicitation/specifications, failure to
adequately justify deviations from full and open competition, minimum requirements




1. Emphasize Governmental Efficiency and Economy
During this time of tightening Governmental budgets, a shift in emphasis from a
full and open competition commitment to economy and efficiency seems appropriate.
However, this can not happen at the agency level without appropriate statutory and
regulatory changes or the Board's more open recognition of the Brooks requirement for
economy and efficiency.
2. Examine the Solicitation for Competition Restrictions
The specifications of the solicitation should be thoroughly examined for any hint
of wording that may not allow a prospective offeror his statutory right to participate.
Close examination of the solicitation for competition restrictive language is essential in
avoiding a protest. If there is any limiting verbiage, change it or document the
justification fullv . Government agencies with ADP/FIP procuring authority should be
made aware of the Board's penchant for competition.
The Contracting Officer should seek technical assistance from a source with a
proven track record. Outside sources may be necessary. Further, the use of draft RFP's
and other market research techniques will aid in eliminating restrictive verbiage and aid
in more adequately defining the agency's competitive requirements.
3. Reduce ADP/FIP Oversight
The invasion of ADP/FIP as an ever increasing aspect of daily life serves to
expand the reach of the GSBCA via the Brooks Act. There appears little touched in
today's society by information processing systems. Congress is pleased with the Board's
protection of competition in ADP/FIP resource procurements. ADP/FIP is a commodity
that is competition protected by CICA. The Brooks Act has outlived its usefulness. It
has created an unnecessarily, burdensome system for acquiring a commodity that is a
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routine part of the American society. The 1984 Brooks Act is no longer necessary-. It
should be repealed, along with its associated amendments. ADP/FIP should be folded
into the mainstream of the Federal procurement system.
D. ANSWER TO PRIMARY RESEARCH QUESTION
What has been the role of the General Services Administration Board of Contract
Appeals (GSBCA) concerning Automatic Data Processing (ADP) protests and what can
be learned from an analysis of recent GSBCA cases?
The GSBCA's role is twofold. First, the role of interpreting the Brooks Act
definition of ADPE. Second, ensuring the application of laws, statutes, and regulations in
the acquisition of ADP/FIP as defined in the Brooks Act as amended. In the first role, the
GSBCA has been expansionary in its jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of the GSBCA demarcates
the definition of ADPE. Therefore, the boundary of what is ADPE and what is not ADPE
expands with the Board's reach for an ever increasing jurisdiction. In the second role, the
GSBCA applies the Competition in Contracting Act with the emphasis on competition.
E. ANSWERS TO SUBSIDIARY QUESTIONS
1. What are the current GSBCA protest procedures?
A simple letter and a 29c stamp filed in a timely manner is all that is required to
lodge a protest with the GSBCA. Following the filing of a protest, the protestor's
attorney is allowed go "fact finding" through an agency's internal memoranda, notes, and
contract information files through a process called "discover)." Discovery allows the
protestor access to internal source selection and evaluation procedures and other pertinent
agency information. The close examination of agency paperwork is augmented by the
protestor's capability to gain access to a competitor's proprietary data through a
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"protective order." The protestor's opportunity for discovery and protective order
information are then enhanced by the trial-type hearing of the GSBCA. Wherein,
witnesses are called to testify before the Board.
Additionally, the Board's willingness to take issue with the agency's discretionary
decision favors protestors. Offerors prefer the GSBCA, while the Government favors the
GAO.
Timeliness, interested party status, and issues of jurisdiction are required
determinations prior to a case being decided on the issues of merit.
2. How Does the GSBCA Define ADP/FIP?
ADPE is defined by the Brooks Act. The GSBCA has expanded the realm of
ADP/FIP through its expansive interpretations. Significant use and incidental
performance arc the key to determining the GSBCA definition of ADP/FIP. Each
acquisition that entails any aspect of using ADP/FIP directly or indirectly will require a
determination for Brooks Act application or Warner Amendment exclusions. The user's
requirement does not necessarily need to be for ADP/FIP primarily for the Brooks Act to
apply. The best way to approach the GSBCA definition of ADP/FIP is to assume that if
there is a hint that computing resources are being acquired or used in the contract, then
the Brooks Act applies. For the DoD, Warner Amendments exemptions are strictly
interpreted. If it is not specifically included in the Warner Amendment then it is not
exemp'. Best advise - do not read beyond the Warner Amendments exemptions. Do not
look for a "loophole" exemption, it most likely will not be there.
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3. What are the Principal Reasons for ADP/FIP Protests?
The principal reasons for protest centers around the evaluation process. The
numbers indicate that this is the primary reason for protest. However, protests regarding
the solicitation and specifications are held in check by the GSBCA's strict application of
timeliness rules.
The Evaluation complaints are usually in regard to the procuring agency's
application of the Evaluation factors as stated in the solicitation and the determination of
responsiveness and technical acceptability of the offer. The responsiveness and technical
acceptability issues attacks both the agency's determination that the awardee was
acceptable and that of an unsuccessful offerors non-acceptability.
The numbers indicate that Solicitation and Specification complaints follow a
close second and third in reasons for protests. The restriction of competition through the
Solicitation and Specification process is the underlying theme in most complaints. The
complaints are varied, ranging from implied contractual obligation to ambiguous
Solicitations and delivery specification to ambiguous and restrictive specifications.
Generally, exclusion from competition from various agencies' actions is the
leading complaint from protestors. Exclusion may be elicited via the evaluation process,
or in the wording of the solicitation and the specifications.
4. What Have Been the Results of These Protests?
The Government procuring agency's actions have been contested in a relatively
small number of ADP/FIP acquisitions. However, it is the few usually high dollar value
cases that arc formally heard at the GSBCA. These are the cases that test literal meanings
and interpretations of laws and regulations. These are the cases that redefine and
sometimes obscure the definition of ADPE and interpret statute.
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Overall, by percentage, it appears that the evaluation process is most susceptible
to the GSBCA's sagacity. Because of the rules of timeliness, many cases are dismissed
without a hearing on other issues regarding the solicitation or specifications. When the
weighted indices are applied giving a higher value to issues granted by the Board, issues
concerning the solicitation and specifications are heavily favored by the Board. Again,
competition is the keyword and it is protected adamantly, both for and against the
protestor. There is always a third party interested in the protest proceedings. Usually this
is the original awardee. His right to compete is also protected by the Board.
Competition is enforced by the Board throughout the ADP/FIP procurement
process. Agencies must fully justify deviations from full and open competition.
5. Since GSBCA Received Jurisdiction Over ADP/FIP Acquisitions, What
Trends can be Identified Regarding ADP Protests?
The trend from industry's perspective is to protest. A protestor has an excellent
chance of being satisfied prior to a formal protest hearing with the GSBCA. If the protest
goes to a Board hearing for resolution on the issues of merit, the protestor has a better
than 459c chance of being granted. A protestor that successfully argues unreasonable, or
unfair exclusion from competition enjoys the most favor by the Board.
Future trends and the issues in favor tomorrow are not easily extrapolated from
the data. The issues suing and vary from quarter to quarter and year to year. However,
there is always the omni present theme of protection of competition.
6. What Actions can be Taken to Minimize the Number of ADP Protests and
the Number of Sustained GSBCA Decisions?
The best way to avoid a protest is by starting with a plan to avoid the protest.
This requires more front end time consumption but will reduce the possibility of the tail
end panic of a protest. The plan should include time to review the Solicitation,
Specifications, and Evaluation criteria thoroughly. The review, amongst other things,
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should be critical to verbiage that may unnecessarily restrict competition. The
examination of the Solicitation, Specifications, and Evaluation factors should look for any
hint of language restricting competition. Although this is true for other commodities as
well, ADP/FIP requires a special knowledge of the commodity and the language to
successfully procure information processing capabilities.
The ADP/FIP procurement staff should be trained and educated in the technical
as well as the contracting aspects of this type of commodity purchase. Understanding the
language is vital. Being able to recognize language that is "buzzword" versus that of
words that are well defined within the accepted industry practice is essential.
The source selection evaluation team/board should not deviate from the stated
criteria. Strict application is required. If the solicitation is determined not to meet the
needs o( the agency, once the evaluation process has begun, cancel and resolicit to the
bona fide needs of the agency.
Avoid terminating an award because of a protest, rather resolve any and all issues
with potential protestors early. If a complaint involves unfair exclusion from
competition, take it seriously and accommodate the protestor, if at all possible.
F. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
1. Congressmen Conyers (D-Mich) has introduced several House Bills regarding
Federal Acquisition. If passed or if still in debate, the impact or potential impact of HR
3161, Title III on the GSBCA and ADP/FIP procurement process could be explored.
2. A continuation of this study methodology after sufficient time has passed would
be appropriate to determine any variations in the GSBCA "personality" due to current
pending legislation, budget constraints, or other factors. Also, an expansion of this study
methodology in regards to time is suggested to adequately factor out the seasonal swings
noted in Chapter VI.
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3. A study of the necessity for the Brooks Act in ADP/FIP acquisition in today's
ever expanding role of information processing in society. Are there viable alternatives to
the way Federal ADP/FIP is acquired? Could ADP/FIP procurement be successfully
folded into the larger body of Federal procurement regulations?
4. An in-depth study of GSBCA decisions on a particular issue of concern could be
conducted. For example, researching issues regarding Best Value vs. Low Cost, or
Commercial style solicitations and specification have been issues of recent concern and
are still not fully resolved.
G. SUMMARY
The Board, whose authority was established by CICA, has lived up to its namesake
law - competition. In this respect, it has fulfilled its responsibility laid upon it by the
Congress of the United States. The Board has upheld the concept of competition almost
slavishly; even at the expense of other Governmental responsibilities. Economy and
efficiency of Government operations is a bit of a misnomer by all popular accounts in the
literature and the media. The direction of the Board is to disregard the Contracting
Officer's and the Government's responsibility to economy and efficiency believing that
competition in and of itself leads to economy and efficiency. In this researcher's opinion,
competition where it makes sense supports economy and efficiency. The need for
competition must be properly balanced with the need for economy and efficiency.
The weighted index adds a higher numerical value to a protest granted. The
operative assumption is that once an issue is tilted against the Government and in favor of
the protestor, the Government's vulnerability is increased. The most interesting element
indicated by the indexing is that the Government, overall, is doing well at litigation in the
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area of evaluation. The areas of consistent concern are the Specification and Solicitation
areas. Protests of this nature are avoidable to a large extent. Avoid restricting
competition!
An underlying factor in all the foregoing discussion is "minimum requirements of the
government" and "avoidance of restricting competition." The combination of the two
philosophies is noble in utterance but in the opinion of the researcher conflict with "best
value" in terms of technology and price.
Full and open competition is always restricted by the terms of any solicitation. A
balance of the fulcrum must be found by the Contracting Officer regarding competition.
And then, the position of the fulcrum must be documentarily justified.
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APPENDIX A
BROOKS ACT, AS AMENDED, 40 U.S.C. § 759
Section 759, title 40, United States Code, contains the Brooks Act, Public Law No.
89-306, 79 Statute 1 127 (1965), as amended.
§ 759. Procurement, maintenance, operation and utilization of automatic data
processing equipment
(a) Authority of Administrator to coordinate and provide for purchase, lease
and maintenance of equipment by Federal agencies
(1) The administrator is authorized and directed to coordinate and provide for
the economic and efficient purchase, lease, and maintenance of automatic data processing
equipment by Federal agencies.
(2) (A) For purposes of this section, the term "automatic data processing
equipment' means any equipment or interconnected system or subsystems of equipment
that is used in automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement,
control, display, switching interchange, transmission or reception, of data or information
(i) by a Federal agency, or
(ii) under a contract with a Federal agency which
(I) requires the use of such equipment, or
(II) requires the performance of a service or the furnishing of a
product which is performed or produced making significant use of such equipment.
(B) Such term includes
(l) computers;
(ii) ancillary equipment;
(in) software, firmware, and similar procedures;
(iv) services, including support services; and
(v) related resources as defined by regulations issued by the
Administrator for General Services.
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(3) This sections does not apply to
(A) automatic data processing equipment acquired by a Federal contractor
which is incidental to the performance of a Federal contract;
(B) radar, sonar, radio, or television equipment;
(C) the procurement by the Department of Defense of automatic data
processing equipment or services if the function, operation, or use of which
(i) involves intelligence activities;
(ii) involve cryptologic activities related to national security;
(iii) involves the command and control of military forces;
(iv) involves equipment which is an integral part of a weapon or
weapon system; or
(v) is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence
missions, provided that this exclusion shall not include automatic data processing
equipment used for routine administrative and business applications such as payroll,
finance, logistics, and personnel management; or
(D) the procurement of automatic data processing equipment or services by
the Central Intelligence Agency.
(b) Procurement, maintenance and repair of equipment; transfer between
agencies, ont utilization; establishment and operation of equipment pools and data
processing centers; delegation of Administrator' authority
(1) Automatic data processing equipment suitable for efficient and effective
use by Federal agencies shall be provided by the Administrator through purchase, lease,




Granted Denied Dismissed Withdrawn Settled Total
3Q/FY89 12 7 1 6 24 63
4Q/FY89 7 5 8 15 36 71
1Q/FY90 9 13 7 20 22 71
2Q/FY90 5 6 2 15 15 43
3Q/FY90 2 7 3 25 13 50
4Q/FY90 13 4 6 22 35 80
1Q/FY91 4 18 10 45 17 94
2Q/FY91 4 12 7 7 13 43
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Aug 91.
Mr. Doug Larsen, Naval Supply Center, Chief Counsel, and the researcher, 29 Aug 91.
CPT Tom McQueen, USN, Commanding Officer, Information Technology Acquisition
Center, and the researcher, 19 Aug 91.
Mr. Carl Peckinpaugh, Secretary of the Air Force/General Counsel, (F/GCP), ADP/FIP
Acquisitions, and the researcher, 16 Sep 91.
Ms. Dorothy Rogers, Naval Regional Contracting Center, Long Beach, and the
researcher, 13 Aug 91.
Mr. Jeff Tucker, General Services Administration, Information Resources Management
System/KMAD, Acquisition Evaluation and Analysis Branch, and the researcher, several
conversations beginning 27 July 91.
Personal conversation between ...
Mr. Floyd Groce, Information Technology Acquisition Center, Chief of ADP
Contracting, and the researcher, 24 Sep 91.
Mr. Jeff Tucker, General Services Administration, Information Resources Management
Svstem/KMAD, Acquisition Evaluation and Analvsis Branch, and the researcher, 25 Sep
91.
1 10
Mr. Mark Weiner, Information Technology Acquisition Center, Chief Counsel, and the
researcher, 24 Sep 91
.
Mrs. Michile Templeman, Instructor. Procurement Analysis School of AcquisiUm






Does your agency buy ADP/FIP? What are the dollar thresholds authorized?
2. Have you or your agency been involved in ADP protests resolved at the GSBCA?
If Yes- continue with question #3.
IfNo-
Does your agency buy ADP?
If no - who buys for you? - - End Interview - -
If yes - how have you avoided ADP protests?
3. What were the 5 predominant, major issues involved in your case(s)?
4. In light of the decisions of the GSBCA, how would you characterize your agencies
defenses?
(i.e., win/win, total win, total loss)
5. What are your impressions of the GSBCA proceedings?
6. Has your agency changed its ADP procurement procedures because of a GSBCA
ruling -
a. in your specific case?
b. in general based upon other published GSBCA decisions?
6. Are ADP bid protests increasing or decreasing in frequency at your organization?
7. Arc ADP protests handled / processed the same as other bid protests?
8. What actions has your agency taken to minimize the chances of an ADP protest?
9. Who (specific person) handles agency bid protests?
10. How much experience does that person have in ADP protests?
1 1. Are ADP protests considered a routine or exceptional situation?
12. Which forum would you prefer for an ADP protest - GAO or GSBCA? Why?






















FED CIR 89-1504 & 1505
ADPPR;V3/N1;P8



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Solicitation - Min Rcqr
Solicitation - Functional
GSBCA 10317-P





































































































































Discussions - Post BAFO
GSBCA 10389-P




















































































Specific make or model
Solicitation-Amendment
GSBCA 10518-P





















































































































































1 legal - contract formation
FTS-2000 telecommunications
GSBCA 10665-P






































































































































































Brand Name or Equal
GSBCA 10802-P
















































































































































































































































































































































































• low cost: complaint concerned selection or non-selection of low cost offer.
• most advantageous: award based on other than price factors.
Bid
• acceptance period: includes mail, facsimile, specific location, etc.
• clerical errors: typographical and other administrative errors.
• late bid/proposal: includes timing of offer.
• misrepresentation/fraud:
• modification of offer
refers to modification of bid after initial proposal.
Competition
• full & open
complaint that full and open competition was not obtained.
• sole source




complaint of "playing" offerors prices against each other.
• debriefing
information meeting with losing offeror(s).
• inadequate/improper
also includes the lack of discussions, (i.e., award without discussions).
• post BAFO
implies discussion being held after the best and final offer, but before award.
• technical leveling
advertent or inadvertent transfer of technology between offerors, may have been
used as defense also in defending a charge of inadequate discussions.
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Equivalency
• brand name or equal
where agency identifies a particular brand of ADP/FIP for acquisition and is
willing to accept other ADP/FIP of comparable capability.
• functionally equivalent
similar to brand name or equal, but where the protestor's claim is not specifically
challenging a "brand name or equal" or a "specific make or model" acquisition.
• specific make or model
where a particular piece of ADP/FIP must be exactly what the agency stated as
their requirements.
Evaluation
• tech - excess capacity
complaint of flawed evaluation process whereby one offeror provided more than
minimum required capability requested by the agency. Closely aligned with a
best value judgment.
• tech - MIPS
subset of technical evaluation keyword. Millions of Instructions per Second
(MIPS) is used as a benchmark test. This keyword was broken out because of an
interviewee interest.
• tech - perf validation
short for performance validation, i.e. benchmarking.
• ambiguous criteria
• competitive range
a complaint of inclusion or exclusion of an offeror into the competitive range.
• cost
includes cost of options that have been "properly" evaluated.
• cost analysis
refers specifically to the process of evaluating the cost of a proposal.
• cost surcharge
the addition of fixed dollar amount to the offer by the evaluating agency.
• improper
complaint of the process of evaluating offers.
• material
refers to material imbalance in the evaluation process or an offer.
• mathematical
refers to a mathematical imbalance in the evaluation process or an offer.
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• non-responsibility
protestors denial of a non-responsibility determination.
• non-responsiveness
protestor's denial of non-responsiveness determination.
• price
complaint of the price evaluation process.
• price reasonableness
complaint of determination on the price reasonableness of an offer, either awarded
or denied.
• responsibility
claim by protestor that awardee is not responsible.
• responsiveness
claim by protestor that awardee's offer was not responsive; term used in the broad
sense, includes both sealed bid and negotiated procurements.
• scoring
complaint concerning the scoring process in an evaluation.
• technical
complaint usually concerning the agency's technical evaluation of an offer, either
protestors or awardees.
• undisclosed
complaint where evaluation criteria was undisclosed.
GSBCA
• economic & efficient
reference by the GSBCA, agency, or protestor to economic and efficient actions
by the Government.
•judgment of KO
where issue of Contracting Officer's judgment was specifically an issue, or could
have been an issue.
• non-compliant





where integrity was a specific issue.
•personnel
general keyword for collecting other personnel issues.
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• rates
where labor rates or other wages in an offer were an issue.
• resumes
where resumes were required as part of the solicitation.
Procedure
• certifications
where certification required by the solicitation became an issue, includes refusal
to provide, error in certification, questioning validity and integrity of certification,
etc.
• cost & pricing data
complaint w here the submission or validity of cost and pricing data was an issue.
• just and approval
where the justification and approval process or reasoning became an issue.
• notification of award
complaint of prompt notification of award or non-award requirements.
• pre-aw ard survey
complaint regarding pre-award survey process.
• proprietary data
complaint regarding disclosure or non-disclosure of corporate trade secrets.
Procurement
• procurement type
complaint regarding type of procurement used by Government, i.e., sole-source,
small business, etc.
• sole source
where sole source procurement became an issue, i.e., the Government should have
or should not have...
• urgency
complaint questioning Governments use of "urgency," or used in defense by the
Government to explain its actions.
Regulation
•A-76
complaint requiring interpretation or enforcement of OMB circular A-76.
• bulletins
issues regarding published bulletins; i.e. applicability, enforceability, etc.
•DPA
issue directly involving or questioning the delegation of procurement authority;
does not include requirements by the Board to submit for a new DPA.
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• handbook;agency guide
same as other issues under bulletins.
• interpretation
issues of a general nature requiring the interpretation of regulations.
•OFPP
issues regarding Office of Federal Procurement Policy statements.
Solicitation
• incomplete
no explanation necessary, closely related to specification.
• ambiguous
issue regarding ambiguous solicitations.
• amendment
issues regarding the amendment of the original solicitation.
• cancellation
complaint regarding the cancellation of a solicitation.
• CBD synopsis
issues raised by either the GSBCA or protestor or agency concerning the synopsis
in the Commerce Business Daily (CBD).
• implied contract
complaint questioning the implied contracts of a solicitation.
• inaccurate
complaint of incorrect information in the solicitation.
• modification
similar in definition to amendment of solicitation.
• requirement overstated
complaint that the requirements of an agency are more than its minimum needs.
• requirements - agency
complaints regarding agency requirements in a solicitation.
• restrictive
complaint that terms of solicitation unduly limited competition.
Specification
• ambiguous
issue regarding the ambiguity of specification as opposed to the ambiguity of the
solicitation as a whole.
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• commerciality
issue regarding commerciality requirements or lack thereof in a specification.
• defective
issue regarding the correctness of a specification.
• delivery
issue regarding a delivery specification.
• functional
issue regarding the type of specification used, in this instance - use or non-use of a
functional specification.
• licensing
issue regarding the requirement to license the use of ADP/FIP.
• restrictive
complaint that a specification un-necessanly limits competition.
• salient characteristic
usually deals with the requirement to provide or not provide specific
characteristics of the ADP/FIP being procured in an equivalency procurement.
• security
complaint regarding security issues involved in an ADP/FIP procurement.
• standards
use of military standards or other recognized standards.
Statute
• buy American Act
issue specifically regarding the Buy American Act.
•CICA
issue specifically regarding the Competion in Contracting Act.
• Trade Agreement Act
issue specifically regarding the Trade Agreement Act.
• Walsh- Heal y




case where a protest was filed at the agency level and "resolved" by the agency.
Either the original protestor was dissatisfied or the original awardec is
subsequently dissatisfied.
• T4C clause
issues regarding the termination for convenience of the Government.
•T4D
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inaccurate 1 1 1 1 4
incomplete 1 1 2 4
requirements - agency 1 1
requirement overstated 1 1 2 4
restrictive 2 1 3
modification 1 1
GROUP TOTAL 7 6 6 6 1 4 2 3 35
Specification ambiguous 1 1 2 2 1 7
commerciality 1 1 9 1 1 6
defective 1 I 2
delivery 1 1
functional 1 1 2
licensing 1 1
restrictive 2 2 3 1 1 1 10
salient characteristic 1 1 1 3
security 1 1
standards 1 1
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functionally equivalent













Evaluation ambiguous criteria 2 -0.5
cost 7 1 -0.7
cost analysis 1 -0.3
cost surcharge 2 2 2.2
competitive range 9 1 -1.3




non-responsiveness 19 1 -4.3
price 2 -0.6
price reasonableness 3 1 0.5
responsibility 4 1 0.2
responsiveness 25 5 -0.6
scoring 1 -0.3
technical 13 3 0.3
tech - MIPS 3 -0.9
tech - excess capacity 1 -0.3
tech - perf validation 3 -0.9
undisclosed 1 1 1.1
GROUP TOTAL 121 36.47c 23 31.97 -4.5
GSBCA economic & efficient 2 -0.6
non-compliant 3 -0.9
judgment of KO 6 -1.8
GROUP TOTAL 11 3.3% 2 2.8% -0.8
Personnel resumes 1 1 1.1
conflict of interest 4 -1.2
integrity 1 -0.3
rates 1 -0.3
personnel 5 1 -0.1
GROUP TOTAL 12 3.6% 2 2.8% -0.8
Procedure just and approval 2 1 0.8
certifications 3 1 0.5
cost & pricing data 1 1 1.1
notification of award 2 1 0.8
propriety data 2 -0.6
pre-award survey 1 -0.3
GROUP TOTAL 11 3.3% 4 5.6% 2.2
Procurement procurement type 1 -0.3
sole source 1 1 1.1
urgencv 1 -0.3























Solicitation ambiguous 6 o -1.8








inaccurate 4 2 1.6









restrictive 3 1 0.5
modification 1 -0.3









defective 2 2 2.2
delivery 1 -0.3
functional 2 (i -0.6
licensing 1 1 1.1
restrictive 10 3 1.2
salient characteristic 3 -0.9
security 1 1 1.1
standards 1 1 1.1
GROUP TOTAL 34 10.27c 11 15.37 5.0
Statute CICA 1 -0.3
Trade Agreement Act 2 1 o.s
Walsh-Healy 1 o -0.3
Bu\ American Act 4 1 0.2
GROUP TOTAL 8 247 -> 2.87 0.4
Termination T4C Clause 1 -0.3
T4D 1 -0.3
bv Agencv 8 3 1.8
'GROUP TOTAL 10 3.07c 3 4.27 1.2






Agency improperly rejected protestor's bid as nonresponsive. (2)
Agency's amended solicitation did not provide for the minimum 30-day response time.
Agency failed to properly document the need for specific make and model specifications
in the solicitation.
Agency terminated a contract improperly by claiming, but not proving, that there were
irregularities in the procurement process.
Agency failed to provide advance notice of a contemplated award with clear knowledge
that other companies existed with competency to do the work, (two protest, both of
which were later overturned by the Untied States Court of Appeals on jurisdictional
grounds)
Agency waived the proscriptions against organizational conflicts of interest under
different phases of the work, (two protests, both of which were later overturned by the
United States Court of Appeals on jurisdictional grounds)
Agency did not make a proper system-life cost analysis and had no valid basis upon
which to conclude what was the lowest overall cost alternative.
Agency did not limit scope of best and final offers.
Agency improperly failed to consider best and final offers in their entireties.
Agency failed to describe the Government's requirements clearly, accurately, and
completely in the invitation for bids.
Agency failed to do procurement planning and adequate market research to be able to
prepare specifications that reflected its minimum needs vis-a-vis the commercial
availability of products to satisfy those needs.
Agency evaluated proposal on factors not specified in the solicitation, (three protests)
Agency did not promptly notify offerors that their proposal had been rejected.
Agency failed to include a specific list of salient characteristics in invitation for bids that
would be required for brand name or equal features.
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Agency did not properly conduct discussions with offerors.
Agency failed to obtain delegation of authority from the Administrator of the General
Services Administration to conduct the procurement.
* Unless indicated otherwise, violations are for one protest.
Note: There were 20 violations in the 17 protests. Some violations occurred in more than
1 protest and some protests had more than 1 violation; therefore the number of violations
will not total 20. Two protest decisions were overturned by the United States Court of
Appeals. These two protests contained more than one violation.
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